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1 - Introduction  
 
This article proposes to discuss the theme of usury taking into account 
various points of view and traditions, in particular Western and Islamic 
ones, in order to outline the constituent features of this phenomenon today 
as well as throughout its historical evolution, with the intent to offer a 
different perspective on the subject matter. 
The following work is divided in two main parts: the former offers a 
brief historical overview of the major theories belonging to Western 
tradition regarding usury and interest and their development through the 
centuries, till their decline and their substitution with a modern vision of 
the problem. While, the latter deals with the Islamic tradition and the 
related concept of riba. 
In particular, the first section follows the evolution of the concept of 
usury since ancient times (the Old Testament), including reference to 
Roman law and, then, to the Scholastic theory, followed by the influence 
held by Protestantism and, afterwards, by Jusnaturalism, to gradually reach 
the advent of capitalism and, eventually, its final outcome within the 19th 
and 20th century common law systems, in particular in the United States.  
The second section introduces the concept of riba and explains its 
historical and cultural background, constituting the natural premise of the 
sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth sections, which address the recent openings 
                                                          
1 Article peer reviewed. 
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of some Islamic communities and list the solutions adopted by the Islamic 
finance to overcome the riba prohibition. 
The final sections try to compare the development of the two 
different traditions analyzed in light of their recent outcomes, underlying 
differences and similarities from a critical perspective, and proposing some 
brief, attempted, conclusions on the matter. 
 
 
2 - Premise 
 
The proscription of usury was the binding rule of the Islamic banking 
institutions of the origins2. Such rule seemed to prevent Islamic banking 
institutions from performing banking activities in legal contexts such as the 
European framework3. 
Nowadays, Islam remains the only main religion prohibiting any 
form of interest, yet this distinctiveness was not always the case. All the 
Abrahamic religions condemned usury and severe restrictions related to 
usury had been in force over about 1400 years. Generally, at the beginning, 
any taking of interest was condemned; but with the passing of the time, 
only exorbitant rates were deemed illegal and this is the kind of regulation 
still in force in many Western countries4.  
Nevertheless, there are clear similarities in the spirit of Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam on economic matters since they emphasize justice 
through just wages and fair prices, condemn speculation and wasteful 
consumption, and advocate moral behavior in commerce5. As a 
consequence, as far as the ideas of interest and usury are concerned, it is 
important to say that Judaism, Christianity and Islam have always 
considered that  
 
“the lender, by definition, possessed a store of capital that exceeded his 
requirements, while the borrower lacked the resources to satisfy his 
immediate needs. It would thus be unfair and even immoral for a 
needy borrower both to repay the capital and to increase the lender’s 
                                                          
2 F.M. Khan, M. Porzio (edited by), Islamic Banking and Finance in the European Union. A 
Challenge, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2010, p. 11. 
3 F.M. Khan, M. Porzio (edited by), Islamic Banking, cit., p. 11. 
4 M.K. LEVIS, Comparing Islamic and Christian attitudes to usury, in Handbook of Islamic 
Banking, edited by M.K. Levis e K. Hassan, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2001, p. 64. 
5 I. WARDE, Islamic Finance in the Global Economy, Edinburgh University Press, 
Edinburgh, 2014, p. 61. 
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wealth still further by paying him interest, especially since the 
additional amount must be taken from the fruit of the borrower’s 
industry”6. 
 
The concept of usury has been food for thought since ancient times. 
Therefore, in order to outline its fundamental features and understandings 
according to the evolution of Western tradition, as well as its similarities 
with the concept of riba within the Islamic World, it is necessary to address 
it from a historical perspective.  
Hence, the following overview describes the major historical turning 
points in Western economic and social development. 
 
 
3 - Ancient history 
 
To begin with, it is worth saying that the three major Abrahamic religions 
(Judaism, Christianity and Islam) initially shared a common prohibition on 
usury. References to such forbidden practice can be found both in the Old 
Testament (in the Pentateuch, the Law of Moses, and in the Psalms) as well 
as in the New Testament (Luke 19: 12-27 and Matthew 25: 14-307) of the 
Bible, wherein the ban on usury or, in other words, on lending at interest, 
is uncontroversial and involves an abuse of the weakened (procedural 
injustice) coupled with an actual violation of justice (substantive injustice) 
which ought to be punished8.  
                                                          
6 I. WARDE, Islamic Finance, cit., p. 61. 
7 «14. Again, it will be like a man going on a journey, who called his servants and 
entrusted his wealth to them. 15. To one he gave five bags of gold, to another two bags, 
and to another one bag, each according to his ability. Then he went on his journey. 19. After 
a long time the master of those servants returned and settled accounts with them. 24. Then 
the man who had received one bag of gold came. “Master“he said, “I knew that you are a 
hard man, harvesting where you have not sown and gathering where you have not 
scattered seed. 25. So I was afraid and went out and hid your gold in the ground. See, here 
is what belongs to you”. 26. His master replied, “You wicked, lazy servant! So you knew 
that I harvest where I have not sown and gather where I have not scattered seed? 27. Well 
then, you should have put my money on deposit with the bankers, so that when I returned 
I would have received it back with interest”» (MATTHEW, 25, v. 14-30, New International 
Version). 
8 The notion of procedural injustice concerns the unlawfulness of the proceedings in 
settling a dispute or of the procedures or methods applied in accomplishing a specific 
activity. From a legal point of view, it resembles the modern notion of due process. For 
example, according to this concept, lending at interest to a poor implies an unfair 
transaction, which is based on one party taking advantage of the other party’s weakness. 
This action can be seen also as a matter of substantive injustice, namely a violation of the 
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Noteworthy is that such prohibition was linked to consumption 
loans and poverty, and it regarded any forms of loan (so, including also 
goods given for profit) not just money, though, it concerned only the 
practice of lending at interest to brothers, while charging interest to foreigners 
was acceptable (this attitude was also shared both by Jewish and Islamic 
communities)9.  
This early approach to usury laid down the basis for Western 
forbiddance of lending at interest throughout 1200 years, as two 
fundamental notions emerged from it: the principle of commutative justice 
and that of distributive justice. According to the former, usury is a sin of 
individual injustice (an injustice committed in dealing with another 
individual, such as stealing)10.  
                                                          
law applicable to the merit of the case.  
9 M.K. LEVIS, Comparing Islamic, cit., p. 65. See also A.M. EL GOUSI, Riba Islamic Law 
and Interest, Ann Arbor University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, 1985, pp. 112-113, who affirms 
that usury occurs every time something more is returned regardless of its nature. This 
Author gives some examples: i) it is usury if the lender lives in his debtor house for free; ii) 
it is preceding usury if one borrows money from another and sends him a present for this 
loan; iii) it is succeeding usury if a one keeps the money of his neighbor for a certain period 
and in giving it back he also gifts a present deeming it a compensation for having the 
money in that period; iv) on the same ground, one cannot say to his neighbor to help him 
in weeding and in exchange he will help the other in digging, or vice versa, neither it is 
possible to ask the same work in sunny time promising in exchange the same kind of 
cooperation in a different season since the performances are more severe in one case than 
in the other; v) it is usurious also asking for a loan in exchange for information. In addition, 
the prohibition of usury is present also in the Hindu religion, which it is applied the 
damdupat, namely the rule against lending at interest (A. GAMBARO, R. SACCO, Sistemi 
giuridici comparati, Utet, Torino, 1996, p. 492). 
10 A.M. EL GOUSI, Riba Islamic, cit., p. 111. The exception of lending at usury to a 
stranger or enemy is consistent with this understanding. B.N. NELSON, The Idea of Usury: 
From Tribal Brotherhood to Universal brotherhood, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1989, 
argues that much of the history of the usury theory in the West can be understood in the 
light of changing ideas of universal brotherhood. M.A. KHAN, Methodology for Theory 
Building in Islamic Economics, in Journal of Islamic Economics, Banking and Finance, n. 10/2014, 
pp. 11-37, and P. ABEDIFAR Lending, the Poor and Islamic Scripture: Islamic Finance versus 
Welfare Islam, available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2687658 (last visited 21 February 
2018). M.L. RIENZI, God and the Profits: Is There Religious Liberty for Moneymakers?, in George 
Mason Law Review, n. 20/2013, pp. 59-61, elucidates as follow: «Religion and business have 
been closely intertwined throughout the American experience. The original corporate 
charter for the Virginia Company in 1606 addressed both commercial matters like the 
granting of mining rights, and religious matters like the propagation of the Christian faith. 
Puritan merchants in New England started each new ledger with the inscription:”In the 
name of God and profit”. So long as God came first in their lives and businesses, they saw 
nothing wrong with pursuing financial success. Over the centuries, the nation's religious 
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Whereas, with regard to the latter, usury is unjust in its redistribution 
of wealth as it injures the poor. It follows that the protection of the poor was 
the greatest need, and, accordingly, each breach thereof had to be punished.  
 
 
4 - Roman law 
 
The legal view and condemnation of usury established in the Old Testament 
was mirrored in Roman law alike.  
Among the categories of lawful loan transactions, the Romans 
distinguished between mutuum and commodatum. The former, was a free of 
charge contract, which concerned the transfer of the ownership of 
consumable goods coupled with the requirement to later return the same 
quantity and type of goods borrowed. While, commodatum was the lending, 
for the borrower’s use, of non-consumable goods coupled with an 
obligation to return those identical goods.  
The distinguishing characteristic of a mutuum was that the thing 
involved became owned11 by the borrower (since in order to consume it one 
                                                          
diversity has increased. The United States is now home to many different religious 
traditions and many different religious views on moneymaking. Some groups profess God 
wants them to be fabulously wealthy, while others seek God by adopting a life of poverty. 
In a religiously pluralistic society, such a diversity of views on religion and moneymaking 
is hardly surprising». 
11 The lender loses any interest ownership in the money provided for a mutuum. See J.T. 
NOONAN, The Scholastic Analysis of Usury, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1957, p. 
135. 
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had to own it)12 and ii) the only permissible promise was to return the 
equivalent value13 (not the identical object)14. 
Due to the importance of trading activities, Romans devised, along 
with the possibility of single transactions, a wider contractual relation, 
namely partnerships, or societas, in which the partners combined their 
resources (such as money, property, expertise or labour, or a combination 
of them) in pursuance of common goals15.  
Under Roman law, partners were allowed to allocate the 
partnership’s profits and losses among themselves, though a single partner 
could not be allotted neither all losses nor all gains.16 In the event the 
partnership’s assets were lost, a partner could not recover his investment 
and hoped for gain from the personal assets of the other partner.17 Such 
restriction on recovery distinguished partnerships from loans, as a partner 
retained an ownership interest in his contribution to the partnership since 
he bore the risk of its loss. However, societates, in their original form, were 
not sufficient to bypass the ban on usury, therefore, the Romans 
implemented further legal fictions so as to cloak those activities which 
actually involved lending at interest.  
                                                          
12 B.M. McCALL, Unprofitable Lending: Modern Credit Regulation and the Lost Theory of 
Usury, in Cardozo Law Review, n. 30/2008, p. 561 ff. (since a commodatum and locatio conductio 
rei required the return of the identical object, the ownership, which involves the ability to 
dispose of or consume the good, was not transferred to the borrower). 
13 Art. 1803 of the Italian Civil Code defines a comodato as a contract by means of which 
one party delivers to the other party a movable or immovable property so as the recipient 
could use it for a specific purpose or length of time, though being required to return the 
property received. The comodato is essentially gratuitous. Hence, in case of a compensation 
for the lending of the property the causa of the contract would change and the latter would 
be regarded as a rent contract which implies also a change in the regulation of the latter. 
The Italian Corte di Cassazione has issued two judgments in this regard. The first judgment 
(Corte di Cassazione, jud. n. 4190 of 1980) sets that if the remuneration for the lending of 
the property is precarious and is aimed only at its custody, then a tenancy at will arises, 
rather than a rent contract. Accordingly, the second judgment establishes that the tenancy 
at will implies a lending of an immovable property which is temporary, revocable and 
focused on the custody of the property itself, and that differs from the comodato in the 
presence of a remuneration (Corte di Cassazione, jud. n. 6164 of 1986). 
14 B.W. DEMPSEY, Interest and Usury, Dennis Dobson, London, 1948, p. 143. 
15 See H. HANSMANN, R. KRAAKMAN, R. SQUIRE, Law and the Rise of the Firm, in 
Harvard Law Review, n. 119/2006, pp. 1335-1403.  
16 See R. ZIMMERMANN, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian 
Tradition, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996, pp. 458-59: an agreement where one 
partner bore only loss and no gain was referred to as a societas leonine. 
17 See J.T. NOONAN, The Scholastic Analysis, cit., p. 134. 
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In particular, the contractus trinus, or triple contract, stood as the most 
significant development of the early partnerships’ framework. In fact, this 
contract included two further agreements in addition to the one founding 
the partnership: one allowed a partner to exchange the share of future gains 
deriving from the partnership for a fixed amount of guaranteed profit, and, 
the other enabled the second partner to return the first partner's capital in 
exchange for a further reduction of the agreed guaranteed profit18. Hence, 
triple contracts were deemed lawful as they were based on the same 
principle underlying societas, i.e. the freedom of partners to allocate future 
profits among them, coupled with the presence of the risk of loss which, 
accordingly, justified the purchase of an insurance against it.  
Moreover, along with the contractus trinus, additional forms of 
transactions were conceived so as to cover the presence of lending at 
interest under different labels, such as foenus nauticum and depositum. These 
could be considered likewise alterations of the original pattern of societas.  
A foenus nauticum involved an investor lending goods or money to a 
seafaring merchant19; in the event the ship was lost during the journey, the 
merchant was not required to repay the amount invested20. On the contrary, 
if the voyage was successful, the merchant had to return the goods loaned 
and provide also the agreed-upon percentage of the expected profits which 
would derive from the subsequent sale of such goods21. The validity of 
foenus nauticum and its exclusion from the category of usury rested upon its 
peculiar form, for it represented a limited in time, special purpose-
partnership, whose aim was to invest in trading on dangerous sea-journeys; 
this contractual relation shared with societas the contribution of assets or 
money on the part of an investor, who retained, to some extent, ownership 
on them, while bearing the risk of lose his investment22.  
The depositum mirrored today’s deposit accounts, at least in form, as 
it regarded the agreement between a depositor, who entrusted his goods to 
a merchant23, who would subsequently return him the corresponding 
amount of money. This transaction implied a passive role of the investor, 
who would invest in alleged fruitful ventures, bearing the risk, however, 
that such commercial activities could be also unsuccessful and could, 
                                                          
18 J.T. NOONAN, The Scholastic Analysis, cit., p. 209.  
19 J.T. NOONAN, The Scholastic Analysis, cit., pp. 134-135.  
20 J.T. NOONAN, The Scholastic Analysis, cit., pp. 134-135. 
21 J.T. NOONAN, The Scholastic Analysis, cit., pp. 134-135. 
22 B.M. McCALL, Unprofitable Lending, cit., pp. 573-574. 
23 B.M. McCALL, Unprofitable Lending, cit., pp. 171-72. 
 Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 4 del 2019 ISSN 1971- 8543 
8 
therefore, bring no profit at all. Hence, the depositum might be deemed a 
simpler type of partnership, in which the interests paid on the goods (or 
money) deposited depended upon the outcome of the venture, and were 
not defined a priori, as in usury loans. 
 
 
5 - Aquinas and Canon law 
 
The legal framework of contractual relationships described in the previous 
paragraph outlasted the end of the Roman Empire and survived largely 
after it, until the 13th century when Europe experienced the development 
of a new era, in which new towns sprang throughout its territory, and a 
powerful social and economic class, the merchants, arose.  
Trading activities increasingly grew, so were the connections and 
profitable exchanges among different areas, deriving from the commercial 
activities carried out by merchants across local and regional boundaries.  
Consequently, the protection of the poor was no longer the main 
purpose pursued by law and the society at large, for the most imminent 
problem consisted in redefining and reclassifying the commercial 
relationships so as to enable merchants to lawfully carry out their trading 
activities, while somehow preserve the forbiddance of usury24, set forth in 
ancient times by the Romans. 
The initial ban on usury established by the Canon law rested upon 
the legal approach provided by Roman law in this regard, and it was 
contained in the Papal Encyclical Nec hoc quoque by Saint Leo the Great (5th 
century), whose contents were then repeatedly reaffirmed over the 
centuries, until the beginning of the 1st millennium B.C. when the previous 
framework had to be adapted and improved so as to fit the new social and 
economic context. The Scholastic theory offered in this regard an additional 
source of arguments against usury, namely the Aristotelian philosophy. 
Saint Thomas Aquinas, the main Scholastic philosopher, persuaded the 
Church’s Fathers that Aristotle’s philosophy could form the basis of 
Christian philosophy. Hence, the definition of usury was further developed 
in light of the Greek philosopher’s thought. 
First of all, Aristotle distinguished between natural and unnatural 
ways of production, including in the latter the income derived from money 
lending, which led to considering interest a violation of natural law. 
                                                          
24 I. WARDE, Islamic Finance, cit., p. 62. 
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Besides, Aquinas drew on Aristotle’s theory of money as barren25, i.e. 
money is used in exchange of goods, but it has no value in itself as it is a 
mere means26, so, if an individual gains profits out of it, he does it against 
natural law.  
Furthermore, Aristotle held that commutative justice required 
equality in all exchange transactions27 and obtaining interests from lent-
money violated this principle; in fact, as money is a medium of exchange, 
whose value is fixed and established a priori, transferring its ownership at a 
higher price is equal to selling something that does not exist, a behaviour 
which evidently leads to inequality in exchanges. And, although it is 
possible to charge separately for the ownership and use of certain assets 
(durable assets), this is not the case for money, since it is consumed in using 
it, as its use involves the transfer of its ownership (i.e. by spending it). So, 
                                                          
25 J.M. KEYNES, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Macmillan, 
London, 1951, Book VI, Chapter 13 and 14, and Book VI, Chapter 23, the Author said that 
Locke was, perhaps, the first to express in abstract terms the relationship between the rate 
of interest and the quantity of money. He opposed the proposal of a maximum rate of 
interest on the ground that it was as impracticable as to fix a maximum rent for land, since 
“the natural Value of Money, as it is apt to yield such an yearly Income by Interest, depends 
on the whole quantity of the then passing Money of the Kingdom, in proportion to the 
whole Trade of the Kingdom (i.e. the general Vent of all the commodities)”. Locke explains 
that Money has two values: 1) its value in use which is given by the rate of interest “and in 
this it has the Nature of Land, the Income of one being called Rent, of the other, Use”, and 
2) its value in exchange “and in this it has the Nature of a Commodity”, its value in 
exchange “depending only on the Plenty or Scarcity of Money in proportion to the Plenty 
or Scarcity of those things and not on what Interest shall be”. Thus, Locke was the parent 
of twin quantity theories. In the first place he held that the rate of interest depended on the 
proportion of the quantity of money (allowing for the velocity of circulation) to the total 
value of trade. In the second place he held that the value of money in exchange depended 
on the proportion of the quantity of money to the total volume of goods in the market.  
26 See ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by R. 
McKeon, Randorn House, New York, 1941. Chapter 5 shows a clear prevalence of the barter 
system: “Now proportionate return is secured by cross-conjunction. Let A be a builder, B 
a shoemaker, C a house, D a shoe. The builder, then, must get from the shoemaker the 
latter's work, and must himself give him in return his own. If, then, first there is 
proportionate equality of goods, and then reciprocal action takes place, the result we 
mention will be effected. If not, the bargain is not equal, and does not hold; for there is 
nothing to prevent the work of the one being better than that of the other; they must 
therefore be equated. (And this is true of the other arts also; for they would have been 
destroyed if what the patient suffered had not been just what the agent did, and of the 
same amount and kind.) For it is not two doctors that associate for exchange, but a doctor 
and a farmer, or in general people who are different and unequal; but these must be 
equated”.  
27 ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, cit., par. 1131b32-1132a7 and par. 1132a14-19. 
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use and ownership of money cannot be transferred separately and hence 
cannot be charged for separately28.  
From such basis, Aquinas and the Scholastic philosophers derived 
three basic arguments against the practice of usury: i) money is not a 
productive asset; ii) money is a fixed medium of exchange and can only be 
sold for its fixed price; iii) the ownership of money means nothing but the 
right to use it in order to buy goods, it followed that it would not be possible 
to separately charge for the use and the ownership of money.  
Moreover, the additional ground for the prohibition of usury, which 
was introduced by the medieval Church, concerned time29 and it lay on the 
assumption that charging an interest (namely gaining a higher amount of 
money than the one previously lent) on the lapse of time required by the 
borrower to redeem the loan was forbidden for time belonged to God30. 
Notwithstanding those new arguments in favour of the prohibition 
of usury, in the 13th century Canon Law strove to find a way to legitimize 
to certain extent the lawfulness of lending at interest. Scholastic 
philosophers drew a distinction of a great importance to merchants: though 
money in itself bore no fruit, or in other words, it did not bring new wealth, 
the asset(s) purchased with that money along with the labour of the 
                                                          
28 B.M. McCALL, Unprofitable Lending, cit., p. 565. 
29 Interest represented a payment for the passage of time. «Under Charle Magne, who 
first extended the usury laws to the laity, usury was defined in 806 c.e. as”where more is 
asked than is given”, while in the 13th century usury or profit on a loan (mutuum) was 
distinct from other contracting arrangements. A usurer, in fact, was anyone who allowed 
for an element of time in a transaction, such as by asking for a higher price when selling on 
credit or, because of the lapse of time, goods both cheaper and sold dearer. The sin was in 
exploiting time itself. Time belongs to God a divine possession. Usurers were selling 
something that did not belong to them. They were robbers of time, medieval gangsters» 
(quotation omitted). M.K. LEVIS, Comparing Islamic, cit., p. 69. See, A. BUCCI, La 
formazione dell’istituto giuridico dell’usura nella Chiesa latina nel XIII secolo, in Stato, Chiese e 
pluralismo confessionale, April 2010, available at www.statoechiese.it (last visited 21 January 
2019), for a complete overview on the medieval time usury emersion, in particular for the 
expert of the Decreti of that historical and juridical era. 
30 Such arguments against usury resemble in part those on which the Islamic prohibition 
of riba is based, in particular the one concerning time, in fact (see E. RICHARDSON, The 
Shari’ah Prohibition of Interest, in Trinity College Law Review, n. 11/2008, pp. 78-87. Islamic 
scholars regarded time as a gift from Allah which cannot, therefore, be valued in economic 
terms. However some striking differences appear between the Islamic and Catholic stance 
in this regard, such as i) the fact that the Qu’ran prohibition of usury is straight and ii) the 
principles stated therein cannot be adapted to the newly arising circumstances as the 
former are as immutable as God, and, iii) as opposed to the Bible, the Qu’ran openly 
endorses trade and commerce, provided that no usury transactions take place. 
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merchant were deemed to generate new wealth instead. Moreover, Canon 
Law recognized, at least implicitly, that the use of money to acquire goods 
or services to commence or expand a business was fundamentally different 
from the use of money to buy consumable goods.  
As a result, Scholastics identified, on the basis of Roman law, two 
main categories of transactions in which lending at interest was acceptable.  
First, the idea of interest (interesse) was considered licit in case it arose 
from any detriment suffered by lending. A creditor could, indeed, demand 
a compensation (damna et interesse) for the damage caused to him by the 
debtor, as a result of the latter’s default or delay in the repayment of the 
principal, corresponding to any loss incurred or gain forgone on the 
creditor’s part. Moreover, the payment could also be demanded under the 
doctrine relating to lucrum cessans: the Scholastic legal theory preserved the 
Roman legal concept of quod interest, or the difference, which is essentially 
the modern concept of expectation damages (including lost profits).31 
Interest was never thought of as a payment on a loan, but as the difference to 
be made up to a party injured by the failure of another to execute his 
obligations, hence interest was purely compensatory. However, such 
provisions opened the door to the taking of interest.  
Second, several transactions mirroring loans were concealed under 
different labels, consequently acquiring a lawful status. Those transactions 
were in part of Roman origin, though adapted to the changes in society’s 
needs, such as societas and depositum32, as well as new dealings such as 
government bonds33 and future sales.  
As regards government bonds, or mons, these were peculiar types of 
transactions which concerned Italian city-states, which had the right to 
conscript money from their citizens in order to finance public policies; those 
compulsory loans were subsequently returned to citizens and, in some 
cases, governments may also have paid them an annual gratuity. Those 
transactions were not considered usury according to the scholastics, 
because they fell under the state power of taxation, therefore, they were not 
definable as voluntary forms of usury.  
                                                          
31 See J.T. NOONAN, The Scholastic Analysis, cit., pp. 105-106. 
32 See MODESTINUS, Digesto, par. 22, n. 2.1, in Encyclopaedia, p. 10. It was similar to a 
modern deposit account; the depositor placed goods - later money - by a merchant who 
would have returned the same amount deposited if he did not make any use of the money. 
The merchant would have returned what deposited plus a portion of his profits if he used 
the money in his own business. The payment to the depositor is related to the use of the 
money left into custody, so there cannot be usury. 
33 MODESTINUS, Digesto, par. 22, n. 2.1, in Encyclopaedia, p. 10. 
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In the case of future sales, instead, they consisted especially in bills 
of exchange, namely in the sale of an obligation to pay an amount of money 
in a different currency sometimes in the future. However, the usurious 
nature of this transaction was covered by the initial price of sale, which 
already involved an interest on the amount and a charge, a fee, for the 
conversion of the currency.  
The justification of these transactions arose from a fundamental tenet 
of the Scholastic theory, according to which, if a person lends money, its 
ownership is transferred to the borrower, which holds that money at his 
own risk, preventing the former from exacting more; while, on the other 
hand, if the lender entrusts his money to a merchant or craftsman so as to 
form a kind of society (partnership), he does not transfer the ownership of 
that money to them; consequently, if the merchant speculates with it at the 
lender’s risk, or the craftsman uses it, the lender would be entitled to 
demand, as something still belonging to him, part of the profits derived 
from that money. So, a partner was seen as retaining an ownership interest 
in his contribution to the partnership since he bore the risk of a possible loss 
in the venture.  
Therefore, the underlying feature shared by these different forms of 
transactions, which excluded them from the prohibition of lending at 
interest, lay in the risk-sharing attitude of the parties involved.  
 
 
6 - 16th Century: Protestantism and the mercantile era 
 
The influence of the Scholastic Theory in the field of economic matters 
lasted until the 16th Century, when Western society entered the mercantile 
era. In this period, commerce expanded throughout Europe and the Church 
was no longer at the centre of the economic life, as new and uncontrolled 
markets arose; this led, eventually, to the necessity to adapt (once again) the 
Scholastic theory of usury to the changes in the economic context34.  
Prior to the 16th century, the request for capital and its uses were so 
limited that it was reasonable to assume that one acquiring money needed 
it for consumption, not for production. But in the 16th century the demand 
for investments in business ventures spiraling increased owing to the 
                                                          
34 J.T. NOONAN, The Scholastic Analysis, cit., p. 199 (“Europe was undergoing a 
commercial revolution in many ways no less far-reaching in economic consequences than 
the Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries”). 
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geographic discoveries of America and the Far East as well as the resulting 
high-risk trading and colonization ventures35. 
In the meanwhile, the Church had not only to face the challenges 
brought about by the new economic reality, but also by the rise and spread 
of Protestantism, mostly represented by Martin Luther and Calvin, whose 
groundbreaking interpretations of economics and more specifically of the 
concept of usury concurred in the transformation of Europe.  
In order to meet those emerging needs, in the first half of the 16th 
century, the Church approved the payment of lucrum cessans to depositors 
in a mons pietatis36. Initially, these institutions were funded by charitable 
donations and had been established to lend money to the poor to fund 
necessary consumption without applying any interest rate. Nonetheless, in 
order to increase the scope of their philanthropic work, the mons eventually 
consented to take cash deposits and accordingly pay lucrum cessans ranging 
from 4% to 6%.  
As a natural consequence of this evolution, once lending at interest 
became an accepted practice throughout Europe, Montes Pietas abandoned 
their charitable role37.  
Pope Paul III recognized that those who could use money to make a 
profit but diverted these funds to assist the poor, were not acting unjustly 
in asking for some compensation for their loss38, as the lending of money to 
fund necessary consumption could create a loss to the lender equal to the 
guaranteed (or safe) investment in the available businesses at the time.  
In so doing, the Scholastic theory by the 17th century had developed 
a methodology that could be applied to the new complex economic reality 
                                                          
35 N.D. RAY, The Medieval Islamic System of Credit and Banking: Legal and Historical 
Considerations, in Arab Law Quarterly, n. 12/1997, p. 80. There are other economic reasons 
in the medieval Islamic which militated against the formation of large concentrations of 
capital. These were: 1) The general unimportance of interest lending, which favors the 
accumulation of capital by sheltering it from risk, and the concomitant dependence on 
partnership and commenda investments, which, on the contrary, must have exerted a 
negative influence on capital formation by subjecting capital to risk. 2) The impossibility 
of the insurance contract in the Islamic economic system. 
36 Mons Pietas can be translated as mountain of piety. 
37 Though Montes Pietas started to charge interest rates, they were so low that these 
institutions were not able to expand within the new economic and financial context of the 
following centuries. 
38 See J.T. NOONAN, The Scholastic Analysis, cit.; Pope Paul III's decision was affirmed 
by two of his successors as well as the Council of Trent.  
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as it permitted some kind of investments in business and income-producing 
assets, as well as in low profit activities39.  
However, as stated above, the amendments to the original Scholastic 
theory of usury were not the only available solution to face the economic 
changes of the 16th century. An additional theory emerged together with the 
Protestant reformation. 
According to Martin Luther40 (1483-1546) money had to be taken as 
a payment for the delay beyond a stipulated time and it could be a fair 
payment for actual damage or injury deriving from this delay. Furthermore, 
Luther traced a distinction, starting from the observation that if income is 
bought without assuming risks and troubles, and in so doing the buyer 
stands no possibility to lose more than he has invested, then, it is clear that 
such trading operation cannot imply any interest owning to the fact that 
there is no risk at stake. Therefore, money in trade and money at interest 
cannot be considered the same, as investing money in trade has no certain 
outcome and the interest which may be obtained is accidental, while the 
interest gained from money invested in income is something constant and 
profitable, hence, they do not share the same degree of risk. 
Whereas, Calvin (1509-1564) denied that the payment for the use of 
money was a sin per se41, as no direct prohibition of usury was to be found 
in the Holy Scriptures, so that they should be interpreted in light of 
individual conscience, the society needs and the saying “do unto others as 
you would have them do unto you”. 
Calvin affirmed therefore that the burden of usury was to be 
imposed on the conscience of the lender. Obviously, such freedom was to 
be limited, as he asserted that “usury is not wholly forbidden among us 
unless it be repugnant both to Justice and to Charity”42. 
                                                          
39 According to the Church legitimization of those new applications of the usury theory, 
only in case of a loan (mutuum), the charging of any interest was still considered illicit, 
whereas, obtaining gains from other types of contracts or transactions was then deemed 
acceptable. 
40 M. LUTHER addressed the issue of usury in his work, On Trading and Usury, in Works 
of Martin Luther with introductions and notes, edited by H.E. Jacobs, A. Spaeth, A.J. Holman, 
Philadelphia, 1915, vol. 4. 
41 M.K. LEVIS, Comparing Islamic, cit., p. 77, according to whom this is the foundation 
of the spirit of capitalism. 
42 C. ELLIOT, Usury: a Scriptural, Ethical and Economic View, available at http://readcentral. 
com/SmartReader/Calvin-Elliott/Usury-A-Scriptural-Ethical-and-Economic-View/ 012 (last 
visited 2 March 2018). 
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This interpretation of usury reflects the entire idea underlying 
Calvinism, namely the direct relationship between man and God which 
results in his daily achievements and religious fulfillment, deriving from 
his hard work and not only from prayers and spiritual contemplation. 
Thus, Calvin continues  
 
“the profit does not arise from the money, but from the product that 
results from its use or employment. I therefore conclude that usury 
must be judged, not by a particular passage of Scripture, but simply by 
the rules of equity”43.  
 
Usury can be considered licit, but only in some cases, namely usury 
is sinful only if it hurts one’s neighbor, “and charity and natural equity 
alone can decide in what particular cases a charge for a loan does hurt a 
neighbor since each believer is guided by his own conscience”44. 
Hence, according to Calvin Reformation the lender is not a sinner, 
but on the contrary he plays an essential role within the society; in fact, 
when an individual voluntary deprives himself of his money, by means of 
which commercial activities are financed as well as job opportunities are 
created, then such lending is considered licit, as long as the interests 
charged are reasonable and do not oppress the debtor. 
Such view was largely welcomed at that time in Europe and many 
protestant States embraced it, consequently dropping the legal prohibition 
on usury. For example, in 1545, after the Anglican schism, a statute was 
enacted in England, legalizing interest but limiting it to a legal maximum of 
10%, and legislation laying down a maximum rate in place of a prohibition 
of interest was made permanent by law in 1571. Such usury laws became 
the norm thereafter in Protestant Europe. 
 
 
7 - 17th century: Jusnaturalism 
 
                                                          
43 C. ELLIOT, Usury: a Scriptural, cit. This can be clarified by an example. Let us imagine 
a rich man with large possessions in farms and rents, but with little money. Another man 
who is not so rich, nor has such large possessions, has however more ready money. The 
latter being about to buy a farm with his own money, is asked by the wealthier for a loan. 
The lender may stipulate a rent or interest on his money and also that the farm may be the 
mortgage collateral until the principal will be paid, but until its payment, the lender will 
be content with the interest or usury on the loan. Why then shall this contract implying a 
mortgage (only for the profit of the money lent) be condemned, when a much harsher, it 
may be, of leasing or renting a farm at large annual rent, is approved?  
44 I. WARDE, Islamic Finance, cit., p. 63. 
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After the spread of the Protestant view on usury, in the 17th century a 
further change of perspective was brought about by Jusnaturalism in this 
regard. 
One of the most influential legal scholar of such school of thought, 
Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) not only opposed the Aristotelian/Scholastic 
idea of the unfruitful nature of money, but also affirmed that if the 
compensation allowed by law did not exceed the proportion of the 
inconvenience on seller and buyer sides, its allowance was neither 
repugnant to the revealed law, nor to natural law: but, if it did exceed those 
bounds, then it was deemed an oppressive sale45. The justice and 
reasonableness of such regulations had, indeed, to be measured by the 
hazard or the inconvenience of lending, for if the reward exceeded such 
conditions, then it became an act of extortion or oppression, otherwise it 
was deemed acceptable46.  
Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694), the other great theorist of this 
doctrine, stated that it was unreasonable that one person lent money to a 
borrower who made profit from it, whereas the lender could not take any 
advantage out of it. Moreover, he, like Grotius, denied the traditional 
Scholastic approach about money infertility in itself, asserting that money 
held a value even though it was a fictitious creation of men in order to avail 
themselves of the chance to comfortably trade goods and services47.  
Whereas, in line with the evolution of the Scholastic theory of usury, 
which took place through the 16th and 17th centuries, Jusnaturalism 
recognized that demanding more than it was given was to be considered as 
                                                          
45 Grotius says that the price of a good tends to be established by the value a community 
tend to offer for it; however, such price is not fixed but “is wont to change suddenly 
according to the abundance or scarcity of buyers, of money and of commodities”. 
Moreover, other specific circumstances may arise, such as an expected loss, absence of 
profit, personal fancy, or sale or purchase, as a favor to another “[and] the loss or absence 
of gain which arises from deferred or anticipated payments”, that may lead to a lower or a 
higher price than the usual one. Hence, the charge of interest or a compensation are 
deemed lawful, provided that the seller and the buyer are aware of such exceptional 
circumstances which influence the sale. See H. GROTIUS, De Iure Belli ac Pacis, Book II, 
Chapter XII, Paragraphs XIV-XXIII, available translated in English at 
https://www.lonang.com/library/reference/grotius-law-war-and-peace/ (last visited 1 March 
2018). See also H. GROTIUS, On The Law of War and Peace, Book II, Chapter XII, Paragraphs 
XIV-XXIII, in https://www.lonang.com/library/reference/grotius-law-war-and-peace/ (last visited 
11 March 2014). 
46 H. GROTIUS, De Iure Belli, cit., Chapter XXI. 
47 S. VON PUFENDORF, De Iure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo, Book VII, Paragraphs 
XIII. 
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unfair as receiving less than the amount lent. Hence, on the premise that a 
lender suffered a loss, because throughout the loan period he was 
prevented from using his own money to make a profit, lending at interest 
started to be considered admissible. This stance reflected the Scholastic idea 




8 - 18th century and 19th centuries: industrialization and capitalism 
 
During the 18th century, Europe witnessed another great economic and 
social transformation, as industrialization and the capitalist ideology 
gained ground, especially in England. Money started to be considered a 
commodity equal to any other goods, which consequently led to a 
redefinition of the notion of usury. 
Jeremy Bentham (1738-1832) supported the practice of usury, 
describing it as “the liberty of making one’s own terms in money 
bargains”49. He proposed also two possible meanings of usury: i) the 
political or legal one, namely, the taking of a greater interest than the law 
allows for and, ii) the moral or social one, i.e. the taking of a greater interest 
than the one acknowledged by the community50.  
Bentham’s analysis of the idea of usury is contained in a series of 
letters51, addressed to Adam Smith, and which aimed at defending, in 
general, the idea of individual and economic freedom. He saw usury as a 
sort of liberty which had long suffered unjust treatment and whose 
prohibition established by law had rather negative effects. The author’s idea 
of usury is crystal-clear: each person should be individually and 
                                                          
48 In so doing, the Scholastic theory preserved the general prohibition of usurious 
interest, though, on the other hand, legitimizing some trading transactions which implied 
lending at interest. 
49 I. WARDE, Islamic Finance, cit., p. 64. 
50 J. BENTHAM, Defense of Usury, available at http://www.econlib.org/library/Bentham/bnt 
hUs1.html#LETTER, I. Introduction (last visited 1 March 2018). The Author maintains that 
the law should provide a clear definition of usury so as to prohibit it, and that such 
definition to be truly effective shall replace the moral one.  
51 Those letters were collected into the work of J. BENTHAM, Defense of Usury, cit., first 
published in 1787.  
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economically free and should also not be called ‘usurer’ - which is an 
inappropriate name - when he takes as much as he can get.52 
Adam Smith (1723-1790), for his part, was extremely moderate 
towards usury laws. For he was well aware that individual savings may be 
absorbed either by investment or by debts, and that there was no certainty 
that they would finally find an outlet in the former. He favored therefore a 
low rate of interest as it increased the chance of savings finding their outlet 
in new investments rather than in debts.  
He admitted that interest and usury were the basis on which the 
market worked, even if he warned the public about the fact that their 
interests were nearly always very different from the ones of traders and 
merchants, which usually aimed at obtaining their own profits. 
Smith, anticipating Keynes, elaborated the following maxim, in order 
to sketch a general notion regarding stocks’ profits (which could not be 
precisely determined) linking them to the variations of interest rates:  
 
“wherever a great deal can be made by the use of money, a great deal 
will commonly be given for the use of it; and that wherever little can 
be made by it, less will commonly be given for it. According, therefore, 
as the usual market rate of interest varies in any country, we may be 
assured that the ordinary profits of stock must vary with it, must sink 
as it sinks, and rise as it rises”53. 
 
Hence, Smith considered the prohibition on interest a mistake, for 
there would always be someone in need of money who would be forced to 
borrow it, and if lending at interest was illegal, lenders would have surely 
charged a higher interest rate owing to the difficulty and danger they may 
have incurred by lending. So, such prohibition did not prevent the usury 
practice. 
Therefore, lending at interest should be considered lawful, though 
the proportion which the usual market rate of interest ought to bear to the 
                                                          
52 C. ELLIOT, Usury, A Scriptural, Ethical and Economic View, Antiusury League, 
Millersburg, 1902, pp. 180-181, notes that usury not only enslaves the borrower and 
oppresses the poor who are innocent of all debts, but it also affects the rich by gathering 
the wealth of the wealthy into fewer and fewer hands. There is a centralizing drift that 
threatens and then finally absorbs the smaller fortunes into one colossal financial power. 
Wealth cannot be so fortified and guarded as to successfully resist the attack of a superior 
wealth when the practice of usury is permitted. The smaller and weaker fortune, using the 
same weapon as the larger and stronger one, must inevitably be defeated and overcome, 
and ultimately absorbed. 
53 A. SMITH, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Methuen and 
Co., London, 1776, Chapter 9, p. 4.  
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ordinary rate of clear profit, necessarily varies as profit rises or falls. 54 
Hence, lending at interest must be adequately proportionate, according to 
profits. 
Carrying on with the analysis of conceptualisation of usury, John 
Keynes (1883-1946) argued that people saved money not because of the rate 
of interest but rather because of their level of income. He also pointed out 
that the main reasons for choosing to keep money in cash rather that in 
bonds were: i) the transactionary motive, i.e. the need for cash for the 
current transactions of personal and business exchanges; ii) the 
precautionary motive, i.e. to provide for contingencies requiring the sudden 
use of money and unforeseen opportunities and iii) the speculative motive, 
i.e. the object of securing profit from knowing better than the market what 
the future will bring forth55.  
Keynes stated that: 
 
“there is a continuous curve relating changes in the demand for money 
to satisfy the speculative motive and changes in the rate of interest as 
given by changes in the prices of bonds and debts of various 
maturities”56. 
 
The strength of these three types of motive will partly depend on 
them being less expensive and on the reliability of the methods of obtaining 
cash - when required - by means of some form of temporary borrowing57. 
According to Keynes, the rate of interest was the price which 
equilibrated the demand for liquidity with its availability; hence, a lower 
rate of interest could stimulate an expansion of capital investments in fields 
in which investing at higher rates would be unprofitable58. 
                                                          
54 A. SMITH, An Inquiry, cit., p. 22. 
55 A.M. EL GOUSI, Riba Islamic, cit., p. 277, deduced that unemployment derived from 
the fact that capitalists do not find it efficient to invest their funds in the fields where the 
rate of return is less than the current rate of interest. For example, given an interest rate of 
5% an investment with a rate of return of 4% for the capital employed in the production of 
glasses is not worthy according to the capitalist perspective and, so, unproductive. The 
capital in this way will remain crystallized and not employed, depriving the society of 
useful activities and, in first instance, of employment. 
56 J.M. KEYNES, The General Theory, cit., Book VI, Chapter 13, p. 27. 
57 J.M. KEYNES, The General Theory, cit., Book VI, Chapter 15; the Author says that 
further reasons are: i) the Income-motive. One reason for holding cash is to bridge the 
interval between the receipt of income and its disbursement, and ii) the Business-motive. 
Similarly, cash is held to bridge the interval between the time of incurring business costs 
and that of the receipt of the sale-proceeds.  
58 J.M. KEYNES, The General Theory, cit., Book VI, Chapter 15. In the Appendix On The 
Rate Of Interest, in Marshall's Principles Of Economics, Ricardo's Principles Of Political 
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Therefore, Keynes, like Smith, was in favor of a properly balanced 
rate of interest. 
Finally, Keynes recognized a fundamental difference between capital 
and mere money, so he re-evaluated the distinction between the rate of 
interest and the marginal efficiency of capital59 which was initially 
expressed by the Scholastic Theory through the difference between usury 
from a mutuum and profit derived from a true societas or census.  
As Henry Sommerville observed: “The canonists' principle was that 
sharing in trade risks made an investor a partner, a co-owner of capital, not 
simply a money lender, and gave a title to profit”60. Thus, the presence of 
the risk (which could only be insured against at a price, namely, foregoing 
larger profits) distinguished capital from mere money61. 
Subsequently, the United States economic philosophy has developed 
parallel to the evolution of the Common Law.  
Hence, after a first period of strict prohibition of usury, in the 16th 
century England enacted the first legislation setting the maximum interest 
rate. Afterwards, in 1854 usury laws were abrogated, reflecting a change of 
perspective towards usury and interest which was strictly connected to the 
historical and economic developments of the time, such as the colonization 
and, further on, the industrialization.  
In particular, in the United States, the issue of usury resulted in two 
strictly connected outcomes, namely the National Bank Act (NBA) of 1863 
and, at a later stage, the Marquette case62.  
                                                          
Economy and elsewhere, III, Keynes theorised a unique rate of interest called the neutral 
rate of interest. Such neutral rate of interest was more strictly defined as the rate of interest 
which prevails in equilibrium when output and employment are such that the elasticity of 
employment as a whole is zero (ID., The General Theory, cit., Book VI,  Chapter 6). 
59 J.M. KEYNES, The General Theory, cit., pp. 351-52. 
60 H. SOMERVILLE, Interest and Usury in a New Light, in The Economic Journal n. 
41/1931, p. 646.  
61 B.W. DEMPSEY, Interest and Usury, cit., p. 3. Once this foundational distinction 
between money and capital is accepted, the law of usury must first and foremost 
distinguish between transactions where money or capital is provided. A loan can be 
defined for purposes of identifying transactions subject to usury law as the provision of 
funds for the purpose of acquiring goods or services which will be withdrawn from the 
market and consumed. A transaction not involving a loan and thus not subject to usury 
law can be defined as the provision of funds for the purpose of acquiring unfinished goods 
or services which will be incorporated into new goods or services for future resale at an 
anticipated gain. These definitions require the law to investigate the purpose of the 
transaction and the use of proceeds. 
62 Marquette Nat'l Bank v First of Omaha Serv. Corp. was a case between a Federal Bank 
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The latter led in 1980 to a revolutionary federal intervention, i.e. the 
removal of any usury limitations upon States, which, over the decades, has 
given rise to serious issues, such as short-term loans (for instance, payday 




9. The prohibition of riba64 
 
At the extreme opposite of the comparatistic landscape, we find the Islamic 
legal system that is based on completely different legal sources compared 
to the ones funding the western legal tradition: primarily the Koran, Islam’s 
holiest scripture which regulates both legal and non-legal issues, secondly 
the Sunna, a compilation of the conversations, actions, affirmations, 
aphorisms, characteristics and deeds attributed to the Prophet Muhammad, 
and thirdly the interpretations of these two written sources given by jurists 
of competing schools of law65. 
                                                          
(First National Bank of Omaha) and a State Bank (Marquette National Bank, Minnesota), 
which was decided in favor of the former. This case concerned the issue of usury rates 
applied by a bank (a subsidiary of a Federal bank) to its clients (resident in a different State 
than the one where the Federal bank was headquartered), which exceeded the usury rates 
allowed by the State of residence of the clients (and of the subsidiary), but not the ones of 
the State of residence of the Federal bank. It was a matter of jurisdiction and fair 
competition, as well as Federal powers vs. State powers. The case, which was initially 
settled in favor of the State Bank, was eventually reversed by the Supreme Court, which 
decided in favor of the Federal bank, on the basis of two precedent judgments: Fisher v First 
National Bank of Chicago and Fisher v First National Bank of Omah. 
63 See A. CORBIN, On Contracts. A Comprehensive Treatise on the Working Rules of Contract 
Law, Minnesota West Publishing, Saint Paul, 1962. 
64 G.M. PICCINELLI, Il Diritto agli interessi nei Paesi Arabi, in Diritto del commercio 
internazionale: pratica internazionale e diritto interno, n. 10/1996, pp. 35-75. For a general 
overview, see J. SCHACHT, An introduction to Islamic Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964, 
and, for a different viewpoint, G.M. PICCINELLI, Il diritto musulmano e dei paesi arabo-
islamici, in La presenza arabo-islamica nell’editoria italiana, edited by I. Camera D’Afflitto, 
Ministero per i beni e le attività culturali, Ufficio centrale per i beni librari, le istituzioni 
culturali e l'editoria, Divisione editoria, Istituto poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato, Rome, 2000, 
and S.A. ALDEEB ABU-SAHLIEH, Interessi e sistema bancario degli Ebrei, Cristiani e 
Musulmani, Centro di diritto arabo e musulmano, Saint-Sulpice, 2011. 
65 See F. KUTTY, The Shari’ah Factor in International Commercial Arbitration, in Loyola 
International and Comparative Law Review, n. 28/2006, p. 565 ff.; H. HARASANI, Analysing 
the Islamic Prohibition on Ribā: A Prohibition on Substance or Form?, in Arab Law Quarterly, n. 
27/2013, pp. 289-296; V. CATTELAN, From the Concept of Haqq to the Prohibitions of Ribā, 
Gharar and Maysir in Islamic Finance, International Journal of Monetary Economics and Finance, 
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Thus, Islamic law is the direct manifestation of the will of God, not 
the expression of the political thoughts of a human lawmaker.  
And because God is the source of authority and the sole sovereign 
lawgiver, Islamic law is immutable, and all human legislation must conform 
to the divine will. The riba forbiddance is part of it. 
Indeed, this prohibition reflects a fundamental Islamic principle: 
accumulating wealth through interests is not a proper way of earning, 
because it is passive and the related increase does not result from labour 
and risk-taking66. 
There are no definitions of the concept of riba in Islamic law67. Under 
sharia, the term “refers to the premium that must be paid by the borrower 
                                                          
n. 2/2009, pp. 384-397 (suggesting a juridical interpretation of the prohibitions of riba, 
gharar and maysir through the outline of the concept of right, haqq, in Muslim law 
alternative to its religious/moral understanding. The Author maintains that these 
prohibitions are grounded more on efficiency of contract and equilibrium of the 
performances than on religion/ethic), and R.J. NEUWIRTH, The Governance of Religion and 
Law: Insights from the Prohibition of Usury, in International Review of Law, available at 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2487048 (last visited 21 February 2018). 
66 N.C. JENSEN, Avoiding Another Subprime Mortgage Bust through Greater Risk and Profit 
Sharing and Social Equity in Home Financing: an Analysis of Islamic Finance and Its Potential as 
a Successful Alternative to Traditional Mortgages in the United States, in Arizona Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, n. 25/2008, p. 825 ff.; H. AHMED, Not Interested in 
Interest? The Case for Equity-Based Financing in U.S. Banking Law, in Entrepreneurial Business 
Law Journal, n. 2/2007, pp. 479-485. See also P.S. MILLS, J.R. PRESLEY, Islamic finance: 
theory and practice, St Martins Press, New York, 1999, pp. 7-9; D. KLEIN, The Islamic and 
Jewish Laws of Usury: A Bridge to Commercial Growth and Peace in the Middle East, in Denver 
Journal of International Law and Policy, n. 23/1995, pp. 535-537: “[i]n one [hadith], it is 
reported that the Prophet 'equated the taking and giving of interest to committing adultery 
thirty-six times, or being guilty of incest with one's own mother”; C. WU, Islamic Banking: 
Signs of Sustainable Growth, in Minnesota Journal of International Law n. 12/2007, pp. 233-236; 
H.M. SHARAWY, Understanding the Islamic Prohibition of Interest: a Guide to Aid Economic 
Cooperation between the Islamic and Western Worlds, in Georgia Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, n. 29/2000, pp. 153-173. 
67 B.L. SENIAWSKI, Riba Today: Social Equity, the Economy, and Doing Business under 
Islamic Law, in Columbia Journal of Transnational, n. 39/2001, pp. 701-702.  
See generally J.F. SEZNEC, Ethics, Islamic Banking and the Global Financial Market, in The 
Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, n. 23/1999, p. 161; G. BILAL, Islamic Finance: Alternatives to 
the Western Model, in The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, n. 23/1999, p. 146; I. PERVEZ, 
Islamic Banking and Finance, in Information Sources on Islamic Banking and Economics, edited 
by S. Nazim Ali, Naseem N. Ali, Routledge, London, 1994, pp. 8-9. 
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to the lender along with the principal amount as a condition for the loan or 
for an extension in its maturity”68. 
For this reason, scholars disagree about the possibility to accept any 
increase as valid69. Recently, a scholar stated that considering riba the same 
as interest is misleading, because “some forms of interest [...] should not be 
considered forbidden riba”70.  
Chibli Mallat warns that interpreting riba as a synonymous with 
interest would have tainted the whole civil and commercial structure of the 
society with illegality71. 
The Qur'anic prohibition of riba reads: 
 
“Those who devour riba 
Will not stand except 
As stands one whom 
The Evil One by his touch 
Hath driven to madness 
That is because they say: 
«[Sale] is like riba». 
But Allah hath permitted [sale] 
And forbidden [riba]. 
Allah will deprive 
[Riba] of all blessing, 
But will give increase 
For [voluntary] deeds of charity; 
For He loveth not 
Creatures ungrateful 
And wicked. 
The Qur'an goes on to warn: 
That they took [riba], 
Though they were forbidden; 
And that they devoured 
                                                          
68 F. AL-OMAR, M. ABDEL-HAQ, Islamic Banking: Theory, Practice and Challenges, Zed 
Books, London, 1996, p. 8. See also Fatwa of Kuwait Finance House, al Fatawa al Shar'iyah, in 
A Compendium of Legal Opinions on the Operation of Islamic Banking, edited by Y.T. De 
Lorenzo, Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance, London, 2004, p. 125. 
69 For a discussion of the major differences among the Islamic schools of law, see 
generally M.H. KHAN, The Schools of Islamic Jurisprudence: a Comparative Study, Kitab 
Bhavan, New Delhi, 1991. 
70 Z. IQBAL, A. MIRAKHOR, An Introduction to Islamic Finance: Theory and Practice, John 
Wiley and Sons, Singapore, 2011, pp. 55-56. 
71 C. MALLAT, The Debate on Riba and Interest in Twentieth Century Jurisprudence, in 
Islamic Law and Finance, edited by C. Mallat, Graham and Trotman, London, 1988, pp. 69-
88. 
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Men's substance wrongfully - 
We have prepared for those 
Among them who reject Faith 
A grievous punishment”72. 
 
The riba prohibition does not prevent the possibility that money 
could be lent under Islamic law, it merely forbids unearned profit (or, in 
other words, profit without expected and common business risks)73. 
According to Islamic jurists, the described prohibition aims at 
avoiding  
 
“the illegality of all forms of gain or profit which were unearned in the 
sense that they resulted from speculative or risky transactions and 
could not be precisely calculated in advance by the contract parties”74. 
 
In addition to the verses above, the Qur'an further warns: 
 
“O ye who believe! 
Fear Allah, and give up 
What remains of your demand 
For [riba], if ye are 
                                                          
72 C. MALLAT, The Debate, cit.  
73 B.L. SENIAWSKI, Riba Today, cit., pp. 15-16, recognizing that both the Pakistani 
Federal Shari’aht Court (Ur-Rahman Faisal v Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parl. 
Affairs, Gov't of Pak. PLD 44 [1992]) and the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court, in 
Rector of the Azhar University v President of the Republic, Supreme Constitutional Court, 
Shari’ah and Riba: Decisions in Case No. 20 of Judicial Year No. 1, in Arab Law Quarterly, n. 
1/1985, p. 100 ff., while interpreting national laws based on shari’ah, determined that 
interest falls under the definition of riba and it is therefore prohibited; C. MALLAT, 
Commercial Law in the Middle East: Between Classical Transactions and Modern Business, in 
American Journal of Comparative Law, n. 48/2000, pp. 125-128 (discussing the Ur-Rahman 
Faisal case and the rationale of the Pakistani Federal Shari’aht Court, including the fact that 
before ruling, the court analyzed the answers to 16 questions posed to “distinguished 
'ulama, scholars, economists and bankers” concerning riba and banking practices). 
Mahmood-ur-Rahman Faisal v Secretary specifically addresses the question of whether all 
interest is riba. In his opinion, the Pakistani Federal Shari’aht Court draws upon the views 
of international Islamic bodies and institutions, Islamic legal scholars, economists, and 
lawyers. Its decision that interest in any amount is riba and it is therefore prohibited, along 
with its corresponding finding that ra's al-mal (the capital sum) is measured according to 
the number of units (not its value), represents the current Islamic legal community's point 
of view on the subject, although such view is not unanimously held. Consequently, twenty 
provisions of Pakistani law, each one related to simple interest in various situations, were 
struck down as unconstitutional because they directly violated the shari’ah prohibition on 
riba (as interpreted by the court to include simple interest). 
74 N.J. COULSON, Commercial Law in the Gulf States: the Islamic Legal Tradition, Graham 
and Trotman, London, 1984, p. 11. 
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Indeed believers.75 
If ye do it not, 
Take notice of war 
From Allah and His Messenger: 
But if ye turn back, 
Ye shall have 
Your capital sums, 
Deal not unjustly, 
And ye shall not 
Be dealt with unjustly”76. 
 
As anticipated, although the Qur'an clearly prohibits riba, what 
constitutes this forbidden practice is still a matter of debate77. 
The noun riba is associated to a pre-Islamic commercial habit made 
illegal by the Qur'an78. The Arab society, at the time of the revelation of the 
Qur'an (7th century C.E.), was pre-capitalist: “production was limited, 
money was scarce [...] and barter trade prevailed”79. This natural economy 
characterized all rural and tribal societies of the time80. 
The majority of persons, generally living at a subsistence level under 
pressing needs, took out loans from moneylenders and merchants (because 
at that time there was no systematic organization of credit lenders) to face 
critic situations such as a severe crop failure, a general famine or a hostile 
raid81.  
Then the borrower could not repay the loan by the agreed date, the 
sum of money that had to be returned to the lender was often doubled (or 
increased by large increments) in exchange for a delay in payment. 
As a result, the rate applied became exorbitant82. In response, the 
Qur'an states: 
 
“O ye who believe! 
Devour not riba, 
                                                          
75 A. BAUSANI, Il Corano, Rizzoli, Milano, 1988, II, v. 278.  
76 A. BAUSANI, Il Corano, cit., II, v. 279. 
77 A.A. IBRAHIM, The Rise of Customary Businesses in International Financial Markets: an 
Introduction to Islamic Finance and the Challenges of International Integration, in American 
University International Law Review, n. 23/2008, p. 611 ff. 
78 A. BAUSANI, Il Corano, cit., II, v. 275. 
79 Z. HAQUE, Riba: the Moral Economy of Usury, Interest and Profit, Ikraq, Selangor, 1995, 
p. 3. 
80 Z. HAQUE, Riba: the Moral, cit., p. 31. 
81 Z. HAQUE, Riba: the Moral, cit., pp. 26-33. 
82 Z. HAQUE, Riba: the Moral, cit., p. 29. 
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Doubled and multiplied; 
But fear Allah; that 
Ye may (really) prosper”83. 
 
See also the following verses describing riba's practice as disfavored 
and forbidden, respectively: 
 
“That which ye lay out 
For increase [(riba)] through the property 
Of (other) people, will have 
No increase with Allah: 
But that which ye lay out 
For charity, seeking 
The Countenance of Allah, 
(Will increase): it is 
These who will get 
A recompense multiplied”84. 
 
The «doubled and multiplied’ refers to the “repetition of the process 
of doubling from year to year”»85. The pre-Islamic practice of allowing 
repayment deferral for an increase in the sum owed is the only one clearly 
indicated in records as riba. Thus, Ibn Hanbal, the founder of the Hanbali 
School of Islamic Law, declared that the practice of pay or increase is the only 
form of riba targeted with certainty by the Qur'an's prohibition86. All the 
other forms of increase in financial transactions are surrounded by 
disagreement within the Islamic legal community87. 
What is certain is that in Islamic law the word riba means an 
inequitable increase. It refers to a situation in which unjust enrichment 
derives from an unequal (unfair) exchange, namely, an increase over the 
                                                          
83 A. BAUSANI, Il Corano, cit., III, v. 130.  
84 A. BAUSANI, Il Corano, cit., XXX, v. 39. See K. REINHART, Introduction to Laleh 
Bakhtiar, Encyclopedia of Islamic Law: A Compendium of the Major Schools, Kazi Pulications, 
Chicago, 1996, pp. 21-23; see also G.M. BADR, Islamic Law: a Survey of Islamic International 
Law, in Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, n. 
76/1982, p. 60 ff.; F.E. VOGEL, S.L. HAYES, Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk, and 
Return, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1998, p. 23. 
85 Z. HAQUE, Riba: the Moral, cit., p. 35. 
86 F.E. VOGEL, S.L. HAYES, Islamic Law, cit., p. 73. 
87 S.H. HOMOUD, Islamic Banking: the Adaptation of Banking Practice to Conform with 
Islamic Law, Arabian Information, London, 1985, p. 100. 
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principal amount lent or the quantity traded88. Chapter II verse 275 states 
that “Allah has allowed sale and forbidden riba”. Recompense  
 
“is the basic trait or the conditio sine qua non of a halal or lawful sale, 
because sale is necessarily an exchange of value against an equivalent 
value; an equitable return and compensation for the goods and 
services”89. 
 
Chapter II verse 276 contrasts riba with voluntary deeds of charity (as 
opposed to the mandatory alms-giving that is one of the five pillars of 
Islam)90. Haque describes riba as an: 
 
“inequitable social and economic system which destroys unity and 
solidarity of a community by creating classes of moneylenders, 
usurers, hoarders and merchants who own the basic means or 
production like land and capital, and exploit the common masses who 
lack these resources and virtually depend on them for their livelihood 
and existence”91. 
 
Thus, according to the Qur'an, riba is an inequitable exchange, 
destructive, and out of place in a fair economic order92. 
The concept of riba is not confined to money-lending but it extends 
to the exchange of goods as well. Shari’ah recognizes two forms of riba: riba 
al-Nasiah and riba al-Fadl93. The distinction between riba al-fadl (excess on 
                                                          
88 A.A. IBRAHIM, The Rise, cit., pp. 699-700, explains that prepaid forward sales were 
permissible because of the overriding benefit to agriculture and other industries, despite 
the excessive uncertainty about the subject matter. Buy-back or same-item sale-repurchase 
were also allowed because the benefits were greater than the risk that such transactions 
might have been a vehicle to charge interest. 
89 Z. HAQUE, Riba: the Moral, cit., pp. 7-11; A.B. DURREZ, Riba in Islamic Law, in Islamic 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, n. 6/1986, p. 57. See also V. CATTELAN, In the Name of God: 
Managing Risk in Islamic Finance, in EABH Working Papers Series, 2014, available at 
http://www.ssrn.com (last visited 21 February 2018). 
90 A. BAUSANI, Il Corano, cit., II, v. 276. (“Allah will deprive [riba] of all blessing, but 
will give increase for deeds of charity [sadaqat]”). 
91 Z. HAQUE, Riba: the Moral, cit., pp. 8-9. 
92 A.R.I. DOI, Shari’ah: The Islamic Law, Ta Ha Publishers, London, 1984, p. 381; A. 
ABDEL-FATTAH EL-ASHKER, The Islamic Business Enterprise, Croom Helm, London, 
1987, p. 2; S.H. AMIN, Banking and Finance Based on Islamic Principles - Law and Practice in 
Modern Iran, in Islamic and comparative law quarterly, n. 9/1989, p. 4. 
93 Gold for gold, like for like, hand to hand and any excess is riba. Silver for silver, like 
for like, hand to hand and any excess is riba; grain for grain, like for like, hand to hand and 
any excess is riba; salt for salt, like for like, hand to hand and any excess is riba; barley for 
barley, like for like, hand to hand, and any excess is riba, dates for dates, like for like, hand 
to hand, and any excess is riba. And if the kinds differ, then sell as you wish, so long as it 
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exchange) and riba al-nasi'a (excess on loans) stems from the historical 
practice94. 
 
1) Riba al-Nasiah deals with riba in money-to-money exchange. 
The term Nasi'ah - meaning to postpone, defer, or wait - refers to the extra 
time granted to the borrower for the repayment of the loan, in exchange for 
an addition or premium charged by the lender. The ban of riba al-Nasi'ah 
implies that the practice of fixing in advance a positive return on a loan as 
a premium for the above-mentioned extra time is not allowed by the sharia. 
It does not matter if the reward is due in a fixed or variable percentage of 
the principal, or as a predetermined amount95.  
                                                          
is hand to hand. See H.A. HAMOUDI, The Muezzin's Call and the Dow Jones Bell: on the 
Necessity of Realism in the Study of Islamic Law, in American Journal of Comparative Law, n. 
56/2008, p. 423, and N.A. SALEH, Unlawful Gain and Legitimate Profit in Islamic Law, 
Cambridge University Press, New York, 1986, pp. 19-20. 
94 During pre-Islamic times, trade was in commodities so, no unanimity among the 
Islamic legal community exists regarding currency exchanges where the currency has no 
intrinsic value because such modern practices are not specifically addressed in the sources 
of Islamic law. M.H. BALALA, Islamic Finance and Law. Theory and Practice in a Globalized 
Worl, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2011, p. 62. In deducing rules on riba, the classical 
jurists derived five rationales as the underlying causes to understand the principles 
governing riba. Collectively, such causes represent “mathematical equivalency; avoiding 
commercial exploitation; minimizing commerce in currency and foodstuffs; linking 
lawfulness of gain to risk-taking; [and] using money and markets to allocate and moderate 
risks”. Another view about the prohibition of riba relates to distributive justice: money 
should keep circuiting within society and not remain limited to a few hands. A more recent 
view is that the religious prohibition saves individuals from abusing the availability of 
potentially self-detrimental credit, helps avoid excessive indebtedness on account of 
individual's irrational behavior, and protects against “paying or receiving unfair 
compensation for receipt or extension of credit”. The more popular view, however, is that 
interest is exploitative, and therefore prohibited. A.A. IBRAHIM, The Rise, cit., p. 700. 
Professor Sanhuri identifies three different purposes for the prohibition of riba: to prevent 
hoarding, to guard against turning currency into a commodity over which to speculate, 
and to ban fraud and exploitation over the trade in items of the same genus. H. A. 
HAMOUDI, The Muezzin's, cit., p. 450. Al-Sanhuri advocated something along these lines, 
thereby rendering the interest prohibition a nullity in the contemporary era. Using 
antiformalist tools such as istislah and istihsan, functionalists might take an additional step 
and expand earlier hadith to propose a doctrine on riba that would meet the functional 
objectives articulated in the Qur'an - namely, avoidance of exploitation or oppression 
resulting in unnatural gains to the stronger party (H.A. HAMOUDI, Jurisprudential 
schizophrenia: on form and function in Islamic finance, in Chicago Journal of International Law, n. 
7/2007, p. 611).  
95 N. HAMMAD, Compensation for an Obligation to Sell Currency in the Future (Hedging), 
in Chicago Journal of International Law, n. 7/2007, p. 521. 
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This kind of riba is the basis of the prohibition on interest in today's 
financial transactions96. In simple terms, one should not be able to earn 
money on money. Money is seen as a medium of exchange without its own 
value except for the capability to give value to goods. The ‘good’ money 
earns value only when it is commodified97; 
 
2) Riba al-Fadl deals with barter or exchange. Its proscription is due to the 
sayings of the Prophet who required that commodities were exchanged for 
cash instead of by barter to prevent unfair behaviours.  
In fact, the diversity in quality of the items bartered can lead to 
mismatches in the quantity and quality of the exchanges, which may give 
rise to an unjust enrichment, i.e. riba98. 
Riba is a vitiating factor that aims at attaining transactional equity by 
requiring exchanges to be bargains by way of mutual consent99. It covers 
the abuses occurring in barter systems of the time. The rationale for the 
prohibition is based on an idea of fair dealing in exchange.  
The aim is to promote equal bargaining in the transactions involving 
poor people with wealthy ones and, more generally, to allow any parties to 
have the ability to void a contract made under unfair terms in the case of a 
prohibited ‘increase’100.  
                                                          
96 C. WU, Islamic Banking, cit., pp. 249-250, clearly states in other words that Islam 
prevents the reward for the time-value element. The reason for that is taken from an 
illustration of the Prophet using an unborn animal: “The price of a pregnant sheep should 
be increased in consideration of what it carries, even though the unborn animal itself could 
not be sold separately. Thus, time may be considered in setting a price, but it is not 
separable from the sold article, and the compensation for time is therefore included as part 
of the price of the article being sold”. The reward for the time element is like rewarding the 
lender twice for the same product. The same Author added that, in Islam, risk-taking and 
sacrificed liquidity should be compensated.  
97 S.A. BHATTI, The Shari’ah and the Challenge and the Opportunity of Embracing Finance 
"Without Interest”, in Columbia Business Law Review, n. 205/2010, pp. 214-215. 
98 A. BAUSANI, Il Corano, cit., XXX, v. 39.  
99 M.H. BALALA, Islamic Finance, cit., p. 62. 
100 Seniawsky explains that if an “equal exchange” has in se the idea of the purchasing 
the power of money so that the “lender does not consistently lose value through loans to 
borrowers”, then, an interest may be included up to the threshold limit, which is equal to 
inflation, without it being prohibited Riba. “The requirement that the lender receive its 
capital sums is satisfied by allowing for adjustments, upward or downward, in the contract 
price to reflect the real value of what was lent and what was repaid. Thus, amounts charged 
above the real (not nominal) value of the capital should be adjudged riba”. As so defined, 
“the prohibition places the borrower and lender on equal footing: it treats all parties fairly, 
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Therefore, the rules of the riba of excess and riba of delay can be 
considered as a type of self-executing price-setting regulation101.  
Riba, initially only discouraged, was gradually prohibited102.  
As charging compound interest was prevalent in pre-Islamic Arabia, 
this was the first practice to be forbidden103.  
The rationale of the discipline of riba lies also in a moral perspective 
of the bargain: only the lender's benefit is certain (the lender's return is 
usually secured via collateral) while the borrower's efforts can potentially 
be without return: this situation is seen as being fundamentally unfair to 
borrowers104. The prohibition on interest is seen as a tool to put the parties 
on a level playing-field105. 
When money is converted into a commodity or a capital asset, these 
can be rented out, leased, or sold for a margin of profit; in doing so, «the 
                                                          
and promotes harmony and goodwill between lender and borrower, or seller and buyer” 
(B.L. SENIAWSKI, Riba Today, cit., pp. 714-715 and pp. 718-719). 
101 M.H. FADEL, Riba, Efficiency, and Prudential Regulation: Preliminary Thoughts, in 
Wisconsin International Law Journal, n. 25/2008, p. 694. 
102 “Balancing economic freedom with risk of abuse” is the guiding principle during the 
classical age of Islamic law. See M.A. EL-GAMAL, Islamic Finance: Law, Economics, and 
Practice, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006, p. 48. The Author refers also to a 
“benefit analysis” to interpret classical Islamic jurisprudence. 
103 I. WARDE, Islamic Finance, cit., pp. 1-2. Y.T. DE LORENZO, The Religious Foundations 
of Islamic Finance, in Islamic Finance: Innovation and Growth, edited by S. Archer, R.A. Abdel 
Karim, Euromoney Books and AAOIFI, London, 2002, pp. 9-10. It was common practice to 
charge interest at a certain maturity date and then compound, or double and multiply that 
interest at future maturity dates. The final prohibition was more clear and categorical, 
which came from one of the last verses of the Qur’an and prohibited, in the view of some 
scholars, compound interest. 
104 B.M. McCALL, Unprofitable Lending, cit., p. 549. M. ANDERSON, The Threat to 
Interest-Free Home Financing: the Problem of State Governments' Prohibition of Islamic-
Compliant Financing Agreements, in Hamline Law Review, n. 37/2014, p. 315, affirms that 
“[s]cholars argue that part of the prohibition against riba is a moral justification to protect 
the poor from being exploited by the rich. Additionally, the prohibition of riba is based on 
fundamental beliefs of economics unique to Islamic culture, which teaches that money has 
no value in and of itself, and all profit must be connected to something other than money 
that actually has value. The idea that economic exchanges must be equal and profits fair is 
also related to this concept. Therefore, those who choose to follow their faith and avoid 
paying interest do so not as a convenient means to avoid being charged late payments, but 
because of a fundamental disagreement on the nature of money and equitable profiting”. 
105 S.A. BHATTI, The Shari’ah, cit., pp. 213-214. 
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lender is acquiring the rental value of an intrinsically valuable good and is 
not “earning money on money itself”»106. 
This hermeneutical reconstruction, clearly, shows the algebraic 
equation of equity prevalence over debt, and the intent of dealing in 
tangibles. These tenets are the ground of every loan arrangement that in 
operative terms is translated into a Profit Loss Sharing Scheme (PLS) 
between the borrower and the lender (the equity preference), where the 
lender purchases a specific asset that will be sold back for a profit (the 
tangibility preference): the lender makes profit using the asset rather than the 
money itself107. 
Therefore, economically speaking, riba represents a ‘premium’ the 
borrower pays to the lender along with the principal amount and it is a sort 
of legal condition for the loan108.  
The forbidden interest rate has four features:  
1) it is positive and fixed ex-ante; 2) it is tied to the time period and 
the amount of the loan; 3) its payment is guaranteed regardless of the 
outcome or the purposes for which the principal was borrowed; and 4) the 
state apparatus sanctions and enforces its collection109. 
The rules related to riba are grounded on five rationales 
“mathematical equivalency; avoiding commercial exploitation; minimizing 
commerce in currency and foodstuffs; linking lawfulness of gain to risk-
taking; [and] using money and markets to allocate and moderate risks”110. 
                                                          
106 S.A. BHATTI, The Shari’ah, cit., p. 215. F. SORVILLO, Pene canoniche, sanzioni 
islamiche e modelli economico-speculativi: i diritti religiosi a sostegno della finanza etica, in Stato, 
Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, n. 8/2016, available at www.statoechiese.it (last visited 21 
January 2019), p. 5 underlines that the Islamic banking and finance is more resilient to 
economic crisis due to its profit and loss sharing nature resembling a sort of partnership 
with the client. See, on the PLS schema, G.M. PICCINELLI, Operazioni islamiche di provvista 
e di gestione del risparmio: il modello del cliente-socio, in AA. VV., La banca islamica e la disciplina 
bancaria europea, Giuffrè, Milano, 2006, pp. 20-21. 
107 S.A. BHATTI, The Shari’ah, cit., pp. 215-216. The same Author explains that the riba 
principle lies also on a social justice concern. Since one of the five pillars of the Islamic faith 
is the annual payment of a certain percentage of one's disposable income as zakaat or alms 
for the poor (and orthodox Muslims are required to give charitably at regular intervals to 
other classes of persons), prohibiting interest preempts its use as an exploitative and 
oppressive tool throughout the course of executing one's moral and social obligations (S.A. 
BHATTI, The Shari’ah, cit., pp. 216-217). 
108 See A.A. IBRAHIM, The Rise, cit., p. 699. 
109 A.A. IBRAHIM, The Rise, cit., p. 699. 
110 F.E. VOGEL, S. L. HAYES, Islamic Law, cit., p. 78. 
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Others recognize in the distributive justice the fundament of the 
prohibition of riba: wealth should not stay in a restricted circle of people, 
but it should be spread among the members of the society111. 
A more recent view is that the religious prohibition saves individuals 
from abusing the availability of potentially self-detrimental credit, helps to 
avoid excessive indebtedness on account of individuals’ irrational 
behaviour, and protects against “paying or receiving unfair compensation 
for receipt or extension of credit”112. 
 
 
10 - Similarities between the sharia prescriptions and the ancient Jewish 
ones 
 
As already mentioned, the Jewish and Islamic laws of usury show 
numerous similarities113.  
The majority of the authorities in both faiths prohibit the charging of 
interest at least between co-religionists.  
As regards the Jewish law, the opportunity to lend money at interest 
has always existed but what originally was an exception, now it is the rule: 
all this happened through a traditional contractual mechanism called heter 
iska114. 
                                                          
111 I.A. NYAZEE, The Rules and Definition of Riba, n. 7, available at http://www.nyazee.org/ 
(last visited 21 February 2018). 
112 M.A. EL-GAMAL, Islamic Finance, cit., pp. 54-55 (arguing from the modern 
psychological and behavioural economic research “that humans exhibit fundamental 
forms of irrationality in time preference, against which precommitment mechanisms 
(including those based on religion) can protect them”. See also A.A. IBRAHIM, The Rise, 
cit., p. 701. 
113 It also serves as a reminder that Jews and Muslims share the same concern over the 
following principles: i) the protection of disadvantaged elements of their respective 
societies; ii) the moral component of business transactions; iii) the labour theories of value; 
and iv) adherence to religious authorities interpreting the word of the same God. A. 
ABDEL-FATTAH EL-ASHKER, The Islamic Business, cit. See also A.R. HARDIEE, M. 
RABOOY, Risk, Piety, and the Islamic Investor, in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, n. 
18/1991, pp. 52-66. 
114 D. KLEIN, The Islamic, cit., p. 535. See, e.g., M. LEWIS, Comparing Islamic and Christian 
Attitudes to Usury, in Handbook of Islamic Banking, edited by M.K. Hassan, M. Lewis, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, 2007). See also, A. WEINGORT, Intérêt et crédit dans le droit talmudique, 
Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, Paris, 1979, p. 492, and H. GAMORAN, 
Jewish Law in transition - How economic forces overcame the prohibition against lending on 
interest, Hebrew Union College Press, Cincinnati, 2008, p. 196. 
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The first point of contact lies in the fact that also “[t]he whole body 
of Jewish law is believed by the orthodox to be divine law, and hence to 
have absolutely and permanently binding force”115. 
The Halacha, the body of Jewish law that is central for a religious Jew 
as the sharia is for Islamic religious people, addresses business and financial 
issues in depth. The relevance of business in the Jewish life is so well clear 
that the Talmud116 states that the first question a Jew is asked when he goes 
to heaven is: “Did you do business faithfully?”.  
This simple - even if not easy - question should be understood as a 
benchmark to define, at least for religious Jews, their relationship with God. 
By all means, the law of usury occupies a central position in halachic 
business law. The biblical prohibition covers contracts with three essential 
elements: a) an agreement; b) at the time of the commencement of the loan; 
c) to pay or provide services to the lender in excess of the amount loaned. 
Such contracts constitute ribbit ketzutzah and are strictly prohibited; the 
contract is void ab initio and the borrower and the lender, as well as the 
scribe to the contract and any witnesses to the transaction, commit a serious 
sin.  
As in both the Islamic and the Christian cultures, Jewish borrowers 
and lenders have found various ways to circumvent the prohibition on 
ribbit, including revocable sales (virtually identical to the original common 
law mortgage) and transactions through non-Jewish intermediaries. In the 
Middle Ages, these approaches mostly gave way to the heter iska117. 
                                                          
115 H.H. COHN, Secularization of Divine Law, in Jewish Law in Ancient and Modern Israel: 
Selected Essays, edited by H.H. Cohn, Ktav Publishing House, Jerusalem, 1971. 
116 A brief explanation of the textual sources of Jewish law is in order. The Jewish law 
in its entirety is referred to as Halacha, a term roughly parallel to the Islamic Sharia. The 
Halacha is primarily composed of: 1) the Torah or Pentateuch, the first five books of the 
Old Testament, which is the written word of God as revealed through Moses on the Mount 
Sinai. The entire body of Halacha derives from the Torah; 2) the Mishnah, the oral code of 
law, which was written in the third Christian century. Because the Torah “is stated only in 
general terms [it] required explanation and amplification to be applied to daily living” (E. 
ZIPPERSTEIN, Business Ethics in Jewish Law, Ktav Publishing House, New York, 1983, p. 3 
and p. 18). Commentaries on the Mishnah are known as the Gemara. There are two 
Gemara, the Babylonian and the Palestinian. The word Talmud consists of both the Mishnah 
and the Gemara; and 4) commentaries on the Talmud. The most important commentaries 
are those of Rashi, Maimonides, and Jacob ben Asher (E. ZIPPERSTEIN, Business Ethics, 
cit., pp. 17-19).  
117 M.H. LUBETSKY, Losing Interest: Financial Alchemy in Islamic, Talmudic and Western 
Law’, in Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, n. 19/2010, p. 238. 
 Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 4 del 2019 ISSN 1971- 8543 
34 
Four scriptural verses ground the usury law118.  
In short, it is forbidden to fix rates of return in partnership 
arrangements and, as a general rule, interest-bearing transactions are 
prohibited among Jews119. These restrictions do not apply to the dealings 
with Gentiles. The fact that any loan granted without interest to a Jew is 
considered a good deed (mitzvot) and an act of loving kindness (chesed) is 
strictly linked to the ratio on which is grounded the opportunity to lend at 
interest to Gentiles: namely, providing interest-free funds for Jews120. 
The Jewish usury law cannot be understood without a reference to 
the development and the general approval121 of heter iska, i.e. a kind of 
partnership agreement that, if carefully drafted, will look like a loan122 and, 
in so doing, will make it possible to circumvent the textual prohibition of 
interest in commercial transactions123. The normal structure of heter iska is 
based on an agreement, in which we have a venturer supplying capital and 
a venturer providing labour (and, as often happens, some expertise in the 
field)124. If the money is lost through theft or accident, this loss will be borne, 
at least in theory, by the lender125. 
However, while this is the default rule, heter iskas can, and almost 
always do, contain contractual provisions requiring the borrower to assume 
responsibility for the funds regardless of what happens to them. Only if the 
borrower is negligent, will he/she be responsible for the full amount. But, 
                                                          
118 See paragraph n. 1 of this text. 
119 Most authorities forbid index in G.M. TAMARI, With All Your Possessions: Jewish 
Ethics and Economic Life, Collier Macmillan Publishers, London, 1987, p. 203. 
120 M. TAMARI, With All Your, cit., p. 170. Some scholars link the economic success of 
immigrant Jews to the availability of interest-free loans provided by their communities. 
121 Not all authorities permit the heter iska (E. BASRI, I, hereby, bequeath: A Comprehensive 
Guide to Jewish Wills, Hakatav Institute, Jerusalem, 1975). 
122 D. KLEIN, The Islamic, cit. 
123 Non-commercial loans require other mechanisms. For instance, the heter mechira, a 
type of lease/buy back arrangement, is the favoured method for structuring a loan for 
personal consumption. E. BASRI, I, hereby, bequeath, cit., p. 167. 
124 E. ZIPPERSTEIN, Business Ethics, cit., p. 44. This stipulation is required by a rabbinic 
ruling that partnerships, in which one party provides capital and the other labour, involve 
the labourer’s payment. The person receiving the funds stipulates in the contract that he 
has previously been paid for his services. This agreement is evidenced in a document 
known as shtar iska. 
125 A.S. COHEN, Halacha and the Contemporary Society, Ktav Publishing House, New 
York, 1984, p. 217. 
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once the heter iska came into existence, “the prohibition on interest lost all 
practical significance in business transactions”126. 
 
 
11 - Riba and its recent openings127 
 
In Prophet Muhammad’s time, Mecca was Arabia’s wealthiest city and it 
depended on trade and pilgrimages of devout people. The continuous 
spread of Islam brought the region’s lucrative trade routes under Islamic 
control. As the economy became increasingly complex, many unknown 
questions started to be addressed.  
When the colonial era came to an end, most areas of law were directly 
or indirectly inspired by Western models; newly independent States started 
to reassess their economic policies; with the decolonization and the new 
trend towards a return to Islam, religious scholars rethought economics and 
social sciences on the basis of their religious training. They did not simply 
assert ideas based on the divine revelations, but they analyzed them 
through logic, scientific theories and empirical evidence128. 
With the changes brought by oil-producing countries it was 
necessary to foster further thinking on economic matters. In 1976, the First 
Islamic Conference was held in Mecca; it was the first time in Islamic history 
that a high-level conference dealt exclusively with economic matters. Three 
years later, the King Abdul Aziz University established the International 
Center for Research in Islamic Economics (ICRIE) to support research in 
many subfields. 
Islamic economics has always had to adapt to different 
circumstances. Sometimes, the Qur’an and the sunna do not manifest their 
                                                          
126 E. ZIPPERSTEIN, Business Ethics, cit., p. 44. 
127 G. JEHLE, Innovation, Arbitrage, and Ethics: the Role of Lawyers in the Development of a 
New Transnational Islamic Finance Law, in Georgetown Law Journal, n. 104/2016), pp. 1350-
1351, states that “[t]he seriousness of the prohibition of riba, conventionally understood to 
encompass most forms of interest, is better understood as an excess paid or received on a 
principal that is in some manner a function of time, as reflected in several Qur'anic verses. 
This prohibition, perhaps more than any other, sets the Islamic finance industry apart from 
conventional interest-based finance and poses a serious challenge to structuring any 
financial transaction - from a simple consumer bank account to a sophisticated cross - 
border investment vehicle”. 
128 M. ARIFF, M. IQBAL, The Foundations of Islamic Banking - Theory, Practice and 
Education, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2011, p. 45. 
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legal and conceptual content very clearly; therefore, establishing economic 
rules requires a strong effort (ijtihad).  
As Islam expanded, it came into contact with different cultures and 
so it was necessary for Islamic jurisprudence to create legislation on 
problems which did not have any legal precedent that may be followed. 
Islamic jurisprudence provides a series of rules by means of which it is 
possible to interpret the sharia, though their existence does not preclude 
adaptive mechanisms129. 
It is possible to say that modern Islamic finance really started in the 
1970s. It was largely driven by the oil boom and it was later transformed by 
the collapse of the oil prices in the 1980s and the changes in the global 
political and economic system130. 
As a consequence, to face this regulatory challenge, “[t]here are 
numerous bodies that oversee the Islamic financial system, interpret 
shari’ah law, and issue recommendations, fatwas, and other forms of 
guidance on how to invest in accordance with the will of Allah”131. 
This multilevel and complex system has hindered or, at least, has 
slowed down the implementation of Islamic finance and its adaptation to 
the worldwide accepted practices. 
The most important organization participating in this heuristic 
process of adaptation is the Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI).  
                                                          
129 I. WARDE, Islamic Finance, cit., p. 38. 
130 Islamic Finance, in the modern sense, grew out of the broader Islamic Revival 
movement that began roughly in 1970s and signaled a reawakening of Muslim self-
identity, evidenced by a growing adoption of Islamic culture, dress, terminology, and 
traditional Muslim values. Prior to this movement, when European colonial powers 
dominated almost the entire Islamic world, most countries adopted Western banking 
systems and commercial models and abandoned Islamic commercial practices. 
Accordingly, Islamic Finance is part of and is influenced by a more general desire to create 
a Muslim sphere of influence that is separate from the current dominant global economic 
and political order and “to restore some level of political and economic power to the 
Muslim world”. N.C. JENSEN, Avoiding Another Subprime Mortgage Bust Through Greater 
Risk and Profit Sharing and Social Equity in Home Financing: an Analysis of Islamic Finance and 
its Potential as a Successful Alternative to Traditional Mortgages in the United States, in Arizona 
Journal of International and Comparative Law, n. 25/2008, pp. 828-829. See also H.M. 
SHARAWY, Understanding the Islamic, cit., pp. 164-165 (explaining Islamic Finance as part 
of a broader Muslim “identity crisis”). 
131 H.E. ROBBINS, Soul Searching and Profit Seeking: Reconciling the Competing Goals of 
Islamic Finance, in Texas Law Review, n. 88/2010, p. 1125. 
 Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 4 del 2019 ISSN 1971- 8543 
37 
This relatively young institution was founded in 1991 and it is 
peculiar because it does not develop products, but it simply gives the model 
framework in which the very financial product can be developed132.  
However, the following institutions as well are noteworthy: The 
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) in Malaysia; the Islamic 
International Rating Agency (IIRA)133; the International Islamic Financial 
Market (IIFM), located in Bahrain; the International Islamic Fiqh Academy, 
which is located in Saudi Arabia and is an organ of the Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference134.  
These regulatory bodies are based in different countries, have 
different membership requirements and also methods for evaluating 
financial products; this puts some obstacles to the communication of a 
coherent message. The aforementioned situation is buttressed by the fact 
that these organizations are of relatively recent formation (having been 
established over the last fifteen years) and they are, therefore, subject to a 
process of constant evolution. 
The issue regarding the legitimacy of bank interests started to be 
debated, within the Islamic world, since the beginning of the last century 
with the utmost urgency. In the absence of a developed Islamic economic 
theory tradition and as a consequence of colonisation, European models 
were adopted. Muhammad’ Abduh, Egypt muftì from 1899 to 1905 (time of 
the protectorate), in a famous fatwa - published in 1905 - stated that interests 
paid on deposits by financial institutions were lawful. 
Distinguishing the typical usurious increase - characteristic of the 
pre-Islamic era - from the share of profits deriving from a legitimate 
business, Abduh considered the interest rate granted by a bank as sharìa-
compliant if derived from the profit earned by the bank itself.  
Every person who deposits money knows that the bank will use it to 
conduct commercial operations from which the financial institution will, 
                                                          
132 “Furthermore, even institutions that heavily rely on the AAOIFI will normally also 
retain an internal or external shari’ah board that supervises compliance with these 
principles” (H.E. ROBBINS, Soul Searching, cit., p. 1125). 
133 The IIRA is the only agency furnishing traditional ratings (like Standard and Poor) 
and a Sharia Quality Rating (starting from 2005 and up to now it is the only agency 
providing this service. Its ratings measure the sharia compliance of certain Islamic financial 
institutions) of sharia-compliant institutions (Id).  
134 According to H.E. ROBBINS, Soul Searching, cit., p. 1135, in addition to the 
fragmented regulatory structure, the uncertainty is also given by the regional differences, 
the risk of changing rules and varying legal opinions and the fact there are only few 
qualified scholars. 
 Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 4 del 2019 ISSN 1971- 8543 
38 
eventually, gain some profit. This gain will be beneficial not only to the 
investors but even to the employees of the bank, to the State and, in general, 
to the entire society. Thus, trying to preserve their own capital, Muslims can 
legitimately earn a profit (interest) as part of a wider social and economic 
project. In recent years, starting from 1989, it has been affirmed - in a series 
of legal comments which have originated a strong debate - that interests 
paid on State's bonds are legal.  
Through such activity the State can pursue objectives of exceptional 
social utility, which help the country’s economic development and the 
citizens’ cultural improvement. The source of justification of the interests 
linked to State bonds resides in the concept of public utility, which is also 
used by the classic jurists135.  
 
 
12 - Riba prohibition in the twentieth century and the sharia-compliant 
financial instruments136 
 
It has been stated that “[i]n the Islamic bank, the seventh century meets the 
21st, as the partnering of investors and entrepreneurs continues to be an 
effective and economically viable technique”137.  
This quote highlights two fundamental facts.  
                                                          
135 M.A. EL-GAMAL, Incoherence of Contract-Based Islamic Financial Jurisprudence in the 
Age of Financial Engineering, in Wisconsin International Law Journal, n. 25/2008, p. 605. See 
also G.M. PICCINELLI, Continuità e discontinuità nell'Islam contemporaneo: linee per una 
lettura dei rapporti tra politica, diritto ed economia, in Le Relazioni transmediterranee nel tempo 
presente, edited by G.M. Melchionni, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2005. 
136 See N.D. RAY, Arab Islamic Banking and the Renewal of Islamic Law, Graham and 
Trotman, London, 1995; C. MALLAT, From Islamic to Middle Eastern Law A Restatement of 
the Field (Part I), in American Journal of Comparative Law, n. 51/2003, p. 699, and C. MALLAT, 
Commercial Law, cit. See also M.S. KHAN, Islamic Interest-Free Banking: a Theoretical Analysis, 
in International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, n. 33/1986, pp. 1-27; T.S. ABDUS-SHAHID, 
Interest, Usury and the Islamic Development Bank: Alternative, Non-Interest Financing, in Law 
and Policy International Business, n. 16/1984, p. 1100, and N.A. SALEH, Unlawful Gain And 
Legitimate Profit In Islamic Law: riba, gharar and Islamic Banking, Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague, 1992, p. 16. 
137 M. BARAKAT, E. SARVER, Comment: Western Banks Taking 1st Steps into Islam's 'No 
Interest' World’, in American Banker: banking and financial news, 30 January 1997, p. 9. 
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On the one hand, Islamic banking138 institutions rely on tradition139, 
while, on the other hand, they base their financial transactions on the 
viability of the partnership model140. 
Considering the eminent role of tradition in Islamic banking, 
commentators point out that the practitioners of Islamic finance must 
comply with some basic rules to implement original Islamic financial 
products: 1) avoid interest or unlawful gain141; 2) avoid excessive risk-
                                                          
138 See F. CASTRO, Banca Islamica, in Digesto Delle Discipline Privatistiche, Sezione civile, 
Utet, Turin, 1988, p. 83. See also, recently, I. SOUMARÉ, La pratique de la finance islamique, 
in Assurance et Gestion des Risques/Insurance and Risk Management, n. 77/2009, pp. 59-78; A.E. 
SOUAIAIA, Theories and Practices of Islamic Finance and Exchange Laws: Poverty of Interest, in 
International Journal of Business and Social Science, 2014, available at http://ssrn.com (last 
visited 21 February 2018); M.A. EBRAHIM, Risk Management in Islamic Financial Institutions 
(available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2528463 - last visited 21 February 2018); S.M. 
FARIDUL, Islamic Banking: a True Alternative to Interest-Based Conventional Banking, in 
International Scholar Journal of Accounting and Finance, n. 1/2015, pp. 33-40, and R. POWELL, 
A. DELONG, The Possible Advantages of Islamic Financial Jurisprudence: an Empirical Study of 
the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index, in Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law, n. 
19/2014, pp. 393-423.  
139 See G.M. PICCINELLI, Continuità e discontinuità, cit. 
140 See also U.F. MOGHUL, No Pain, No Gain: the State of the Industry in Light of an 
American Islamic Private Equity Transaction, in Chicago Journal of International Law, n. 7/2007, 
pp. 484-486, the Author explains in detail the Partnership idea of the Islamic Finance. 
According to this Author, Islamic finance is the most recent attempt to bring the finances 
and economies of both individuals and nations into compliance with the Divine. Partners 
are required to meet a variety of additional conditions such as: a) their legal authority to 
the contract, their delegate authority, and the fact that they must serve as guarantors; b) 
the capital must be specified and present at the time of contract and made of fungible 
money; c) the ratios of profit-sharing must be known and precisely specified at the time of 
contract, as well as the percentage of each partner; in other words, profit entitlement has 
not to be specified as a particular amount neither has to be tied to a particular capital 
contribution, because the total amount of profits is unknown, and Islamic law forbids a 
guaranteed, fixed return; d) in the case of loss, partners must share losses on a pro rata basis. 
Like any private equity investor, this Islamic bank conducted its preliminary due diligence 
to determine whether this particular investment transaction was economically worthwhile 
(G.M. PICCINELLI, The Provision and Management of Savings: the Client-partner Model, in 
Islamic Banking, cit., edited by M.F. Khan, M. Porzio, pp. 23-39). 
141 It is true that economic progress is often linked with risk. However, in Islamic 
finance, risk is not held by one party to the transaction (as in Western finance), but it is 
rather shared by all parties. And while this approach is not necessarily unique compared 
to other religions, these principles are combined with specific guidelines for trade and 
commerce. According to Islamic concepts of social justice, lenders and borrowers must 
share both rewards and losses, not simply a fixed, risk-free return. Wealth accumulation 
within an economy must be distributed in a fair manner reflecting actual gains in 
productivity and innovation (B. KHAN, A. CROWNE-MOHAMMED, The Value of Islamic 
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taking, gharar142; 3) recognize that money is not a commodity; 4) prohibit 
specific industries143; 5) recognize that money does not change in value as 
time passes144.. 
The words reported above correspond to the official position of the 
Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance, which has stated that: 1) in 
broad terms, Islam prohibits all forms of economic activity which are 
morally or socially outrageous; 2) While acknowledging the individual's 
right to own wealth legitimately acquired, Islam makes it obligatory to 
spend that wealth judiciously, without keeping it idle or squandering it; 3) 
While allowing an individual to retain any surplus wealth, Islam seeks to 
reduce the margin of the surplus for the well-being of the community as a 
whole; 4) Islam seeks to prevent that the accumulation of wealth in a few 
hands could lead to the detriment of society; 5) The Islamic economic 
system pursues social justice and a no-self-destructive individual 
enterprise145.  
However, not every partnership arrangement is consistent with the 
Islamic principles. 
An important objective of the Islamic banking movement146 is the 
implementation of a system which ensures that Islamic banking 
                                                          
Banking in the Current Financial Crisis, in Banking and Finance Law Review, n. 29/2010, p. 441). 
See also, from a sector-based perspective, G.M. PICCINELLI, Banques Participatives Et 
Investissements Pour Le Développement Méditerranéen (Actes Du Seminaire, Rome, 27 Mai 
1995), Ipo, Rome, 1996. 
142 It has been stated that, in the conventional system, banks have asymmetric 
information, since it is really hard for them to control the business they have financed; in 
particular, it is difficult to discover the way in which a debtor will use the funds. An Islamic 
bank, on the other hand, has a valuable insight into the operations of the company being 
part of it. Since, then, an Islamic bank is tied to the business it finances, it could be said that 
the wealth of the financial system is strictly connected to the overall economy (B. KHAN, 
A. CROWNE-MOHAMMED, The Value, cit.). 
143 A.A. IBRAHIM, The Rise, cit. In the case of wine and gambling, the Qur’anic solution 
was complete avoidance, since those activities are not essential. By contrast, transfers of 
credit and risk are at the heart of finance and without them an economic system cannot 
function. The Islamic legal solution, in this case, was to impose restrictions on the means 
of transferring credit and risk, through prohibitions of riba (i.e., usury) and gharar (i.e., 
excessive uncertainty and ambiguity). The forbidden riba is essentially ‘trading in credit’ 
and the forbidden gharar is ‘trading in risk’, such as unbundled commodities. 
144 G. BILAL, Islamic Finance, cit., p. 146. See also A.A. MUSCATI, Late Payment in Islamic 
Finance, in UCLA Journal of Islamicand Near Eastern law, n. 6/2006, p. 47. 
145 Y.T. DE LORENZO (edited by), A Compendium, cit. 
146 For an explanation of its first developments see M. ANWAR, Islamicity of Banking and 
Modes of Islamic Banking, in Arab Law Quarterly, n. 18/2003, p. 62. 
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institutions' actions comply with sharia. According to this model, a 
supervisory board of religious advisors reviews all proposed financial 
transactions147.  
These supervisory boards provide guidance to the bankers and help 
them to respect the sharìa principles.  
Typically, when confronted with an unprecedented issue, the banker 
poses a question to the sharia Board and then, a fatwa, id est a comment 
interpreting the Islamic law, is returned148. 
According to the opinion of Talal De Lorenzo, in the modern Islamic 
finance industry, the Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) is the single most 
important factor in the management of risk149. 
As it is commonly known, in order to be accepted by Muslim 
consumers and investors, a financial product or service must be sharia-
compliant, in other words, it must first have the approval of a religious 
authority150.  
This necessity is so deeply rooted that “without formal approval 
through certification by means of a fatwa, no issuer or product provider will 
be able to market the financial service or product successfully to the Islamic 
financial community”151.  
                                                          
147 J.M. TAYLOR, Islamic Banking - The Feasibility of Establishing an Islamic Bank in The 
United States, in American Business Law Journal, n. 40/2003, p. 385. 
148 Efforts have been undertaken to compile and index these fatwas to help develop 
uniformity in the relatively young field of Islamic banking. See, e.g., Y.T. DE LORENZO 
(edited by), A Compendium, cit.  
149 Y.T. DE LORENZO, Shari’ah Compliance Risk, in Chicago Journal of International Law, 
n. 7/2007, p. 397. 
150 In some jurisdictions, regulators now require both a Sharia Supervisory Board and a 
fatwa for any company offering Islamic financial services and products (Y.T. DE 
LORENZO, Shari’ah Compliance, cit., p. 397). C. ARJONA, G. JEHLE, Islamic Law and the 
Limits of Amorality: Re-Conceptualizing the Legal Ethics of Transnational Islamic Finance, in 
Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, 27/2018, p. 249 reminds that “Muslim 
customers and investors demand services that fully comply with Shari"ah rules, primarily 
the prohibition of riba”. Furthermore, “Islamic law is not static and, in fact, the classical 
jurists provide several permissible techniques for adapting the law to the changed 
circumstances, including the Hanafi concept of hiyal (legal stratagems, also referred to as 
makharij, or exits) and various methods of choosing among divergent scholarly opinions 
(tatabu" al-rukhas, talfiq), as well as forms of equitable reasoning such as istihsan and 
istislah”.  
151 Y.T. DE LORENZO, Shari’ah Compliance, cit., p. 397.  
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This certification, therefore, plays a crucial role for a Muslim client 
since it guarantees that a product complies with the legal regulations and 
with the sharia rules and standards152.  
Therefore, even if there is a deep-rooted criticism regarding the 
modern Islamic financial transactions considered almost identical, at least 
in substance, to the conventional finance products, the opinions of a board 
of scholars (re)assure orthodox Muslims that they are not performing any 
condemned riba practice153.  
However, the mere fact that a fatwa has been issued or that a SSB is 
present is not enough to guarantee the market acceptance of a financial 
product or service154.  
This happens because there is the risk that a fatwa is (i) ambiguous 
and, so, it will not be correctly understood, (ii) is not sufficiently detailed, 
or (iii) is too detailed and thus indecipherable. At the same time, also SBBs 
                                                          
152 Y.T. DE LORENZO, Shari’ah Compliance, cit., pp. 399-400. Typically, SSBs assist in 
the pre-certification stages, such as product development and structuring, or in the early 
stages of operations. Then, the SSB will issue a fatwa to certify the finished product, process, 
or service. In the case of a sharia-compliant offering, this will take place before an Offering 
Memorandum or Prospectus is issued or before a product is introduced to the market. By 
this stage, the SSB should have worked with the management to identify and to mitigate 
all possible sharia-compliant risks. Thereafter, the SSB will continue to assist in the risk 
management of the product or service. Besides, J.M. TAYLOR, Islamic Commercial Banking-
-Moving Into the Mainstream?, in The Transnational Lawyer, n. 18/2005, p. 417, the Author 
clearly underlines that “shari’ah board members are performing due diligence on behalf of 
the consumers who are without access to the details of what is offered to them and without 
experience or qualifications to evaluate those details in light of shari’ah teachings. In other 
words, shari’ah supervisory boards directly represent the Muslim investor's and 
consumer's religious interests”. B.H. MALKAWI, Shari'ah Board in the Governance Structure 
of Islamic Financial Institutions, in American Journal of Comparative Law, n. 61/2008, p. 539, 
and R. WILSON, Shariah Governance for Islamic Financial, Institutions, in Journal of Islamic 
Finance, n. 1/2009, pp. 59-64. 
153 Furthermore, this perception is extremely powerful in a postcolonial context, M.M. 
TOMEH, Persuasion and Authority in Islamic Law, in Berkeley Journal of Middle Eastern and 
Islamic Law, n. 3/2010, pp. 141-171, poses a rhetoric question: “which way do we follow, 
our own tradition or that of others?”. Interest has been decried as a Western institution and 
a tool of exploitation and imperialism. See, e.g., M.A. EL-GAMAL, Contemporary Islamic 
Law and Finance: the Tradeoff Between Brand-Name Distinctiveness and Convergence, in Berkeley 
Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Law, n. 1/2008, p. 194, who talks of repackaging the so 
called Islamic financial transaction in order to mimic conventional finance transactions 
simply adding “transaction costs without promoting the social justice concerns that 
ostensibly underlie the appeal of Islamic finance”. 
154 Y.T. DE LORENZO, Shari’ah Compliance, cit., p. 401. 
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bear the risk of not being accepted as a qualified authority155 to give an 
opinion on a particular financial service156. 
The Islamic financial institutions, by means of these fatwa, create 
and implement products and tools to carry out interest-free banking 
transactions according to the partnership model157. 
In developing these instruments, an Islamic financial institution 
considers the philosophy of risk sharing (in order to avoid the 
predetermined and fixed interest rate in favor of a profit and loss sharing 
arrangement between the creditor and the debtor)158 and the promotion of 
the social and economic welfare (the promotion of an entrepreneurism that 
goes beyond profit maximization)159. 
                                                          
155 “Factors that influence the selection of scholars for an SSB generally include their: (1) 
public reputations as academics; (2) relevant honors and titles; (3) advisory roles with 
public institutions; (4) publications (especially on the subject of Islamic finance); (5) 
membership on the shari’ah boards of reputable international financial institutions; (6) 
their academic backgrounds and other fundamental qualifications like facility in both the 
English and Arabic languages, and appreciation for the broader social and economic 
contexts of Islamic Finance; and (7) availability. In recent years, as demand for such 
scholars has continued to grow, this particular consideration has taken on added 
significance. In businesses that require quick decisions-securities trading, private equity, 
and the like-the issue of accessibility can be crucial” (Y.T. DE LORENZO, Shari’ah 
Compliance, cit., pp. 401-402). 
156 Y.T. DE LORENZO, Shari’ah Compliance, cit. Financial institutions normally require 
an SSB with local or regional membership only. In any case, it is a good practice to hire 
scholars of international repute whose backgrounds cover a broader cultural and linguistic 
constituency. Then, it is necessary to bond the activity of the SBB and of the management 
in order to reduce the risk of compliance with the sharia principles. 
157 See A. BANAGA, G.H. RAY, C. TOMKINS, External Audit and Corporate Governance 
in Islamic Banks: A Joint Practitioner - Academic Research Study, Avebury, Aldershot, 1994, p. 
13. 
158 See M.A. EL-GAMAL, "Interest" and the Paradox of Contemporary Islamic Law and 
Finance, in Fordham International Law Journal, n. 27/2003, pp. 108-111 (describing the 
dichotomy between those scholars who view interest as unlawful under Islamic law and 
those who have more relaxed views on Islamic banking and finance). 
159 M.J.T. McMILLEN, Asset Securitization Sukuk and Islamic Capital Markets: Structural 
Issues in These Formative Years, in Wisconsin International Law Journal, n. 25/2008, p. 703, 
dealing with sharia issues where unanimity among the sharia boards is missing. The Author 
lists some of these cases: 1) the breadth of the indemnity provided by the project sponsor 
in respect of operational matters; 2) the permissible segmentation of the overall transaction 
to facilitate hissa purchases by the banks; 3) the nature of relevant events (such as 
construction milestones) and whether hissa purchases may be effected at those times or 
whether hissa purchases may only be effected at the completion of construction; 4) profit 
and loss allocations among the members of the musharaka; 5) the times at which the 
murabaha agreement or agreements pertaining to the sale of the hissas by the banks to the 
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13 - Solutions  
 
Although the description of the main Islamic financial instruments160 is 
essential to fulfill the present survey, a premise is necessary.  
                                                          
project sponsor may occur; 6) the valuation of the hissas in connection with the murabaha 
sales; and 7) the matters previously discussed in connection with the AAOIFI Sukuk 
Clarification. A. FUCCILLO, F. SORVILLO, Religious freedom and objectives for economic 
intercultural development, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, n. 10/2013, available at 
www.statoechiese.it (last visited 21 January 2019), p. 7, states that “[r]eligions have in fact 
always confronted economic systems in their doctrine, relating them mainly to the ethics 
of their teachings, and in this field each of them has a flourishing tradition that has an 
impact on individuals and guides their actions. The consequences are evident in areas 
(such as economics), too often superficially described as completely secularized, where the 
sacred and sacredness are something extraneous or irrelevant, but in which the impact of 
certain religious ideologies becomes nevertheless tangible. Today, in fact, it are the effects 
of ethical references (traditionally -though not exclusively – the domain of religions) that 
revive the idea of an economic development equal for all, and a decisive rejection of the 
serious inequalities that characterize modern globalized societies”. The same author goes 
on saying that “[i]n this way, banking is not exclusively aimed at corporate profit 
maximization, but must work towards building a sustainable economy in which it become 
an instrument supporting the principles of social justice and equitable distribution of 
wealth among all of the members of the Islamic community. In this sense, religion becomes 
a function of moral suasion of individuals, but especially of the company managers, forced, 
in their selection of targets and parameters of corporate positioning, not only to take into 
account factors like profit and the stability or survival of their companies in the markets, 
but also to provide a coherent response to the values imposed by religious observance. This 
framework, combined with the strong sense of religious affiliation that characterizes 
Muslim society, it becomes fully functional in conveying the choices of "client-believers" to 
forms of banking products specifically designed to ensure satisfaction and respect for their 
needs, in particular those of a religious nature. However, these results are not the exclusive 
preserve of Islamic banks.” A. FUCCILLO, F. SORVILLO, Religious freedom, cit., p. 16. 
160 For a quick survey of the most famous Islamic financial instruments see A.U. KAZI, 
A.K. HALABI, The Influence of Quran and Islamic Transactions, in Arab Law Quarterly, n. 
20/2006, p. 325. There, the description of these instruments is followed by a brief history 
of the Islamic banking system. 
160 U.F. MOGHUL, Separating the Good from the Bad: Developments in Islamic Acquisition 
Financing, in American University International Law Review, n. 23/2008, pp. 735-736, clearly 
underlines that, in recent time, the Islamic finance industry has seen the establishment and 
growth of an Islamic private equity and of an Islamic venture capital. Related to this matter, 
the same Author, at pp. 740-741, specifically deals with the fundamental issue of Escrow 
arrangements. This legal instrument is commonly used in equity transactions to secure a 
party in case of a representation or warranty breach or an indemnity claim. Normally, the 
bank, as escrow agent in exchange for a fee, follows indications (included in an escrow 
agreement with the list of permitted investments) related to investment of the escrow 
property. If, on the one hand, the structure of such agreement is not problematic (since it 
is similar to the Trust and where the trustee under Islamic law is generally not deemed 
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In the world of Islamic financial instruments, the only ones which 
reflect perfectly the profit and loss sharing principle (and, hence considered 
unanimously Halal) are Mudàraba and Mushàraka.  
In other Islamic financial operations, the financier is paid for his 
services through fees161 or mark-ups on the price of the goods bought with 
his help, and the risk sharing is more nuanced. 
                                                          
liable for losses or damages to the property in trust absent his negligence, wilful 
misconduct, or breach of obligations to the property owner. See F.E. VOGEL, S.L. HAYES, 
Islamic Law, cit., pp. 114-116 and 112-113 (mentioning that Islamic fiduciary law generally 
favours the trustee because the owner selected the trustee). This principle is the inverse of 
the Anglo-American common law governing fiduciary conduct. See ID., p. 113, on the 
other hand, the list of permitted investments commonly found in such agreements was 
problematic; this was identified at the outset by counsel prior to sharia department review. 
The prohibition of riba extends to the receipt of interest on investments of the type typically 
permitted in escrow agreements as well as the investment in companies having riba-based 
income. In 1998, the Dow Jones Islamic Market Indexes' sharia board issued a fatwa setting 
forth a series of tests to determine the basis on which a publicly traded company was 
acceptable. There, the description of these instruments is followed by a brief history of the 
Islamic banking system. 
161 U.F. MOGHUL, Separating the Good from the Bad: Developments in Islamic Acquisition 
Financing, in American University International Law Review, n. 23/2008, pp. 735-736, clearly 
underlines that, in recent time, the Islamic finance industry has seen the establishment and 
growth of an Islamic private equity and of an Islamic venture capital. Related to this matter, 
the same Author, at pp. 740-741, specifically deals with the fundamental issue of Escrow 
arrangements. This legal instrument is commonly used in equity transactions to secure a 
party in case of a representation or warranty breach or an indemnity claim. Normally, the 
bank, as escrow agent in exchange for a fee, follows indications (included in an escrow 
agreement with the list of permitted investments) related to investment of the escrow 
property. If, on the one hand, the structure of such agreement is not problematic (since it 
is similar to the Trust and where the trustee under Islamic law is generally not deemed 
liable for losses or damages to the property in trust absent his negligence, wilful 
misconduct, or breach of obligations to the property owner. See F.E. VOGEL, S.L. HAYES, 
Islamic Law, cit., pp. 114-116 and 112-13 (mentioning that Islamic fiduciary law generally 
favours the trustee because the owner selected the trustee). This principle is the inverse of 
the Anglo-American common law governing fiduciary conduct. See ID., p. 113, on the 
other hand, the list of permitted investments commonly found in such agreements was 
problematic; this was identified at the outset by counsel prior to sharia department review. 
The prohibition of riba extends to the receipt of interest on investments of the type typically 
permitted in escrow agreements as well as the investment in companies having riba-based 
income. (In 1998, the Dow Jones Islamic Market Indexes' sharia board issued a fatwa setting 
forth a series of tests to determine the basis on which a publicly traded company was 
acceptable as the target of an investment. Among other things, this fatwa applied the 
prohibition of riba with some discretion to arrive at a certain tolerance threshold of the 
presence of riba as well as other prohibitions). “As an entity operating per Islamic norms, 
the buyer could not agree to the permissibility of such typically permitted investments 
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And here finds its place the concept of hila (Arabic plural: hiyal), or 
legal fiction. Throughout these stratagems, a legal transaction is created 
that, even if substantially void, becomes formally acceptable162. 
According to this legal technique, the main challenge faced by the 
sharia finance industry (but also by the operators and advisors of the 
market) is to ensure that the label ‘sharia-compliant’ is only applied to 
products complying with the underlying ethical basis of sharia financing163. 
                                                          
neither for itself, nor for its counterparty, the seller. The parties did, however, agree that 
the escrow property would belong to the seller, and, as can be expected, the seller sought 
to invest its property in the manner it deemed fit. The conclusion that the escrow property 
would belong to the seller certainly made structuring an alternative escrow agreement all 
the easier from an Islamic legal perspective. The buyer was primarily concerned that the 
types of permitted investments be suitable for the purposes of the escrow. The escrow 
property had to be kept intact to the maximum extent possible and be liquid and readily 
available in the event the buyer was to make a claim for it. Ultimately, the parties agreed 
on these conditions as the required investment parameters. It must be mentioned that such 
an unconventional escrow arrangement required a flexible bank as escrow agent with an 
appreciation of the long-term potential of the growing Islamic investments market”. See 
also U.F. MOGHUL, Separating the Good, cit., p. 741.  
162 These stratagems are both linguistic (the substitution of the word profit for interest, 
for instance, was considered sufficient to render a substantively conventional loan 
‘Islamic’) and legal (the sequence of perfectly valid agreements that combined together 
reaches unlawful outcomes). O. AGHA, Islamic Finance: Principle Before Profit, in Berkeley 
Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Law, n. 2/2009, pp. 128-129. Scholars disapprove of this 
tactic as it is deceptive and may constitute a form of hypocrisy; it enables potential third 
parties to participate in a non-compliant transaction with the false belief that it is a genuine 
transaction. 
163 W.S. HEGAZY, Contemporary Islamic Finance: From Socioeconomic Idealism to Pure 
Legalism, in Chicago Journal of International Law, n. 7/2007, p. 581, says that the driving force 
in the current prevalence of the legalistic trend in Islamic finance is the use of legal 
stratagems (hiyal). Jurists distinguish between two main categories: 1) stratagems designed 
to achieve an outcome or objective sanctioned by the sharia and 2) stratagems designed to 
circumvent the substance of an Islamic rule or prohibition. In general, stratagems under 
category 1) are considered legitimate solutions (makharij shar'iyya) if they employ a lawful 
means to reach an outcome permissible under the sharia, even if such outcome is not the 
primary, or default, outcome intended by the sharia for the use of such a means. G.M. 
PICCINELLI, Il sistema bancario islamico, in Oriente Moderno, n. 1/1988, and, specifically, in 
the Introduction to this work, I principi e gli istituti finanziari islamici: alcuni aspetti giuridici 
relativi alle banche islamiche, pp. 1-44. From a descriptive point of view, “hiyal could be seen 
as excessive human intervention in the divine principles and laws set down by the Qur'an 
and Sunna”. The author follows stating that Islamic industrious merchants in the Middle 
Ages developed legal fictions and formalisms not for their own sake (i.e., not for the mere 
purpose of having a formalism), but for the underlying objective was to avoid adverse kadi 
judgments, rulings that would deem their financial transactions contrary to the Shari'a. 
These legal fictions "arose outside of, and alongside" the body of Islamic law, a corpus that 
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a) Musharaka (Partnership Arrangement)  
The musharaka (partnership) is an agreement in which the financial 
institution provides part of the capital required by its customer in 
consideration of the fact that profits and losses will be proportionally 
shared according to a pre-negotiated agreement. The financial institution 
provides a percentage of the capital needed by its customer, who in return 
will proportionately share profits and losses in accordance with a formula 
agreed upon before the transaction164.  
The customer contributes to the business by providing some capital 
and sweat equity, represented by his management efforts and know-how165. 
Sometimes the activity of the customer is taken into account when deciding 
the shares: profits are divided proportionally not only to capital 
contribution but even to the labour supplied166. 
Islamic banks, especially in home financing, use a modified version 
of this contract called musharaka mutanaqisah (diminishing partnership)167. 
Here, the Islamic bank and its beneficiary enter into a partnership related to 
the ownership of an asset, on the condition that the bank “will gradually 
sell [its] share to the beneficiary at an agreed price and in accordance with 
an agreed schedule”168. 
The Islamic bank provides the financing for early acquisition of the 
property. The pre-determined payment schedule, through which the 
Islamic bank sells its share in the asset to the beneficiary, is benchmarked to 
the prevalent market interest rate. Although charging interests directly on 
                                                          
was itself "in the process of development." In time, these legal fictions were subsumed into 
Islamic Law, becoming "essentially part of the body of the Shari'a." Not surprisingly, 
however, hiyal were not universally accepted by the classical Muslim jurists and their 
madhabs, or legal schools. E. GROSSMAN, The Human Dimension of Shari’a Law, in New 
York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 50/2018, p. 1030. To sum up the 
different approaches, the Hanafi school is the most supportive of hiyal, the Maliki school 
is has not a clear cut position, the Shafi'i school ranged from a denial of hiyal to a mild 
acceptance, and, finally, the Hanbali scholars are against hiyal. E. GROSSMAN, The 
Human, cit., pp. 1030-1031. 
164 See A. BANAGA, G.H. RAY, C. TOMKINS, External Audit, cit., pp. 14-15. 
165 See I. PERVEZ, Islamic Banking, cit., p. 21. 
166 See H. VISSER, Islamic Finance - Principles and Practice, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
2013, pp. 55-57. The Author explains that this practice is not always accepted because of 
the difficulty to measure the labour and translate it into shares. 
167 See I. PERVEZ, Islamic Banking, cit., p. 21. 
168 I. PERVEZ, Islamic Banking, cit., p. 21. 
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asset-financing would be subject to the riba prohibition, Islamic banks have 
largely adopted this transaction structure. 
 
b) Mudaraba (or Venture Capital Transactions)  
Mudaraba is a special kind of partnership in which one party gives money 
to another for investing it in a commercial enterprise169. In practice, it can 
be translated as a trustee finance contract (or trust financing) or fiducia and 
it is also known with the name qirad. The bank, or any other money 
provider, acts as a financier (rabb-ul-mal) and provides the entire capital 
needed for financing a project. The other party, the agent (mudarib), 
manages the venture and brings their labour and expertise in.  
The capital provider is similar to a sleeping partner.  
Parties agree beforehand on the proportion in which they share any 
profits, while losses are borne exclusively by the capital provider. The agent 
cannot share any loss, because the sharia stipulates that one cannot lose that 
he did not contribute170.  
The main differences with musharaka, explained in the previous 
paragraph, are that the financier has no right to participate in the 
management (which is carried out only by the mudarib) and its liability is 
limited to its investment. In case the bank participates in the management 
of the affairs, this will be done for a fee171.  
The agreement rules that the financial institution will take an agreed 
upon percentage of the profits but, as in the civilian case of the association 
in participation, it will bear the risk of losing the monetary funds 
invested172. Therefore, a possible loss is only suffered by the rabb-ul-mal173. 
In other words, like musharaka transactions, even in mudaraba ones a 
financial institution provides capital to an entrepreneur174, with the 
                                                          
169 M. TAQI USMANI, An Introduction to Islamic Finance, Idaratul Ma'arif, Karachi, 2000, 
p. 12. 
170 H. VISSER, Islamic Finance, cit., p. 54. 
171 H. VISSER, Islamic Finance, cit., p. 54; G. BILAL, Islamic Finance, cit., p. 156. The bank 
also acts as a mudarib when investing the depositors' money, assuming the role of their 
agent. 
172 See H.M. SHARAWY, Understanding the Islamic, cit., p. 169 (“In exchange for the use 
of the capital, the entrepreneur agrees to give a specified share of future profits to the 
investors, who in turn are exclusively responsible for any loss to the capital while in the 
care of the entrepreneur”). See also H. VISSER, Islamic Finance, cit., p. 54. 
173 M. TAQI USMANI, An Introduction, cit., p. 14. 
174 I. WARDE, The Relevance of Contemporary Islamic Finance, in Berkeley Journal of Middle 
Eastern and Islamic Law, n. 2/2009, pp. 159-171. The mudaraba is also known as commenda 
partnership. More in detail, it is an association between the rabb-el-maal (financier) and the 
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important difference that the financial institution provides all the capital, 
while the customer provides only labour and expertise175. 
The customer/entrepreneur serves the financial institution as its 
agent (mudarib), with the commitment to manage the funds in the 
venture176.  
 
c) Murabaha (Financing on a Cost-Plus Basis) 
One of the most typical financial instruments is the murabaha, which 
actually constitutes a contract of sale177.  
In this very case the bank plays the role of an intermediary and 
purchases the item desired by its client; then, in a second moment, the same 
financial institution resells that item to its client at the purchase cost plus a 
mark-up178. The seller is obliged to reveal to the buyer the cost of the good 
requested. If such price cannot be known in advance, the contract changes 
and becomes musawama: namely, the mark-up is decided without a precise 
landmark. The customer usually agrees to pay the item in installments179. 
                                                          
mudarib (entrepreneur) where, on the liability side, the depositor is the rabb-el-maal and the 
bank is the mudarib, while, on the asset side, the bank is the rabb-el-maal and the client is the 
mudarib. It is a sort of a double mudaraba principle. 
175 See I. WARDE, The Relevance, cit., pp. 18-19. 
176 A parallel is visible with the Talmudic law where this kind of contract - called palga 
milveh u'palga pikadon (PMUP) - is characterized by an egalitarian approach since 50 per 
cent of the investment come from the financier and 50 per cent from a loan to the 
entrepreneur. Furthermore, since it is clear that a lender-creditor relationship is in force, 
and, in order not to violate the law of ribbit, the financier pays the managing partner a 
salary, (even a symbolic one dollar). This condition is not required by the sharia. See M.H. 
LUBETSKY, Losing Interest, cit., p. 253. A salient feature of this kind of contract is that, 
since a PMUP contract cannot guarantee the level of profit/repayment of the principal, 
parties can envisage a clause in which the expected profit is indicated. If the recipient 
claims a loss, the PMUP may require: 1) to take a solemn oath in front of a Jewish court or 
the entire synagogue, and/or 2) to produce a high number of witnesses testifying to the 
loss. However, because of the fear of the Orthodox Jews to mention the name of the Lord 
in vain, the ‘oath clause’ practically converts the PMUP into a fixed-return contract: the 
heter iska. “The proliferation of the heter iska reveals how Jewish law, a formalist and 
actualizing tradition, takes a permissive approach to interest-avoiding transactions once 
they reach a certain level of complexity” (M.H. LUBETSKY, Losing Interest, cit., p. 254). 
177 G. BILAL, Islamic Finance, cit., p. 153. 
178 See A. BANAGA, G.H. RAY, C. TOMKINS, External Audit, cit., p. 13. 
179 See G. BILAL, Islamic Finance, cit., p. 153, and H. VISSER, Islamic Finance, cit., pp. 57-
58. 
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It is normal practice to transfer directly the asset to the client (even if 
the financial institution is the buyer) in order to avoid transaction costs180. 
In line with this habit, Islamic banks often authorize the customer to act as 
the bank's agent to permit the asset’s transfer in its own name. It is worth 
mentioning that, despite some criticism, this instrument accounts forever 
seventy percent of the Islamic financial transactions181. 
 
d) Ijara and Ijara wa iqtina (Lease Financing)182 
The concept of leasing is represented in the Islamic world by the ijara, where 
a financial institution “purchases an asset and leases it to a Client”183.  
In the most typical epiphany the bank has ownership of the assets 
during the lease period; while, on the other side, the client owes a rental fee. 
With regard to the equipment, the financial institution owns the asset 
throughout the lease period and the customer pays the financial institution 
a rental fee184.  
The client maintains the right to buy the item leased throughout the 
leasing period or at the end of the lease itself, without being obliged to do 
so185 and, at the same time, without any guarantees that the bank will sell 
                                                          
180 P. MOLYNEUX, M. IQBAL, Thirty Years of Islamic Banking: history, performance and 
prospects, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005, pp. 169-170. 
181 H. VISSER, Islamic Finance, cit., pp. 57-58. See also J.C.T. CHUAH, Islamic Principles 
Governing International Trade Financing Instruments: a Study of the Morabaha in English Law, 
in Northwestern University Law Review, n. 27/2006, p. 137 ff. 
182 “Halakha and shari’ah both allow rental contracts. However, the ijara contract used 
in Islamic banking has dubious legality in halakha due to the promise to remit the item to 
the borrower upon the conclusion of the contract” (M.H. LUBETSKY, Losing Interest, cit., 
p. 252-253). One solution elaborated by the practice of Talmudic legal scholars/experts is 
a mixed sale-lease agreement, where the financier purchases the item and sells it back, 
fraction-by-fraction, to the purchaser. In this way, the financier has the legitimate 
prerogative to charge the co-owner rent for the use of its remaining fraction. The final 
outcome - in practical terms - recalls the ijara (even if the co-ownership and the mixed 
purchase-rental payments increase the level of elaboration and complexity). M.H. 
LUBETSKY, Losing Interest, cit., p. 253. 
183 I. PERVEZ, Islamic Banking, cit., p. 23. 
184 See G. BILAL, Islamic Finance, cit., p. 154. See H.M. SHARAWY, Understanding the 
Islamic, cit., p. 171. 
185 G. BILAL, Islamic Finance, cit., p. 154. The difference between the two lies in the fact 
that ijara: 1) a lease/hire begins the day the asset is delivered to the client and not when 
the contract is signed; 2) the lessee is not liable for the full rent if the asset is destroyed; and 
3) the purchase at the end of the contract cannot be made binding. 
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him the good. Such sales can be agreed on between the parties in a separate 
contract186.  
In ijara wa iqtina the lessee pays installments that include a portion of 
the final sale price of the item. In this way the customer acquires the right 
to buy the item at a predetermined price when the lease period comes to an 
end187.  
 
e) Qarde Hasan (Benevolent Financing) 
Financial assistance to charitable institutions or carried out for 
humanitarian purposes is provided with free-of-charge loans through the 
so-called qarde hasan188.  
But, notwithstanding the intentions declared, the following 
requirement must be met: the beneficiary of the loan signs an unconditional 
obligation of repayment and, as often happens, a collateral is also 
required189. Sometimes, some small administrative costs are foreseen for the 
beneficiary190. 
                                                          
186 See I. ABDAL-HAQQ, A Model of Islamic Banking and Finance in the West: IslamiQ, in 
Journal of Islamic Law and Culture, n. 6/2001, p. 101, where the Author presents IslamiQ as 
an emerging Islamic banking and financial services organization. In particular, then, it is 
described that, even if leasing has been adopted by many Islamic financial institutions, few 
of them have paid attention to the fact that a 'financial lease' has a number of characteristics 
more similar to interest than to an actual lease transaction. Since the difference between an 
interest-based financing and a lease does not lie in the amount paid to the financier (lessor, 
even though the amount of the rent claimed from the lessee is equal to the rate of interest), 
the Author suggests that the lessor, after entering into a lease agreement, can sign a 
separate unilateral promise undertaking that if the lessee has paid the full amount of the 
rent due, and wishes to purchase the asset at a specified price, the leased asset will be sold 
at that price. 
187 For amplius, see H. VISSER, Islamic Finance, cit., pp. 59-60. The structure of this kind 
of operations resembles the conventional mortgage; here, the borrower in general does not 
actually see the money used to purchase the good. See M.M. TOMEH, Persuasion and 
Authority, cit., pp. 153-154, the Author properly describes this kind of transaction: «Rather, 
the lender pays the purchase price to the title company which then transfers the money to 
the seller (or lender). The loan is tied to some tangible asset, such as a home or a car. From 
the perspective of the mortgagor, he never sees the money he ”borrowed. The mortgagor 
gets a house (not cash), for which he pays a monthly payment and, at the end of a term, 
owns the house”». M.A. El-Gamal notes that the distinctions between a conventional 
mortgage and many ostensibly ‘Islamic’ finance solutions are illusory. See M.A. EL-
GAMAL, Islamic Finance, cit., p. 48. 
188 See I. PERVEZ, Islamic Banking, cit., p. 23. 
189 See I. PERVEZ, Islamic Banking, cit., p. 23. 
190 See A. BANAGA, G.H. RAY, C. TOMKINS, External Audit, cit., p. 16. 
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In accordance with the Islamic approach to economics, qarde hasan 
“are for the benefit of the individual and the society at large”191. According 
to their peculiar nature, such activities “do not constitute a significant 
source of financing by Islamic banks”192. 
 
f) Istisna (Manufacturing Contract) 
Parties enter into a manufacturing contract for a specified product; 
payments are made as the product becomes closer to completion, so they 
depend on the work progress193.  
Islamic finance institutions use this contract form to finance a 
manufacturing project which will involve two different manufacturing 
contracts: the first one is between the party advancing a manufacturing 
request and the bank, and encompasses the price the client will pay, usually 
in installments, and the agreed date of delivery of the product the bank will 
provide194; the second contract, instead, is a contract between the bank and 
the manufacturer which will produce and deliver the item bargained for195.  
 
g) Bai'salam (Forward Sale)  
Bai'salam is a sale contract where parties agree to a future delivery for a price 
paid in advance196. This financial instrument constitutes a sort of exception: 
forward contracts are generally not permissible because one should not sell 
what he does not possess197.  
                                                          
191 S.H. SIDDIQUI, Islamic Banking: genesis and rationale, evaluation and review, prospects 
and challenges, Royal Book Company, Karachi, 1994, p. 53. 
192 S.H. SIDDIQUI, Islamic Banking, cit., p. 53. 
193 S.H. SIDDIQUI, Islamic Banking, cit., p. 173. 
194 S.H. SIDDIQUI, Islamic Banking, cit., p. 173. 
195 S.H. SIDDIQUI, Islamic Banking, cit., p. 173. 
196 The so called emptio rei speratae. See A. LUMINOSO, La compravendita. Corso di Diritto 
Civile, Giappichelli, Turin, 2011, p. 79. 
197 This kind of technique “has a vast potential to finance productive activities in crucial 
sectors, particularly agriculture, agro-based industries and the rural economy as a whole. 
It also provides an incentive to enhance, as the seller will spare no effort to produce at least 
the quantity needed for settlement of the loan taken by him as the advance price of the 
goods. It could be also useful for the creation of a stable commodities market, especially of 
seasonal commodities. It enables savers to direct their savings to investment outlets, 
without waiting, for instance, until the harvesting time of agricultural products or the time 
when they actually need industrial goods and without being forced to spend their savings 
on consumption” (http://www.islamic-banking.com/profit_and_lose_sharing.aspx. Last visited 
13 October 2016). 
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For this reason, even if bai'salam is recognized by the sunna itself198, 
it is not available for every commodity and it is restricted to agricultural 
products, fungibles and to providing some capital to small traders199. 
 
h) Takaful (Islamic Insurance) 
Islamic insurance200 industry developed in an unconventional way201. Even 
if Islamic law recognizes the need to protect against loss deriving from 
natural calamities and acknowledges risk taking as part of the 
entrepreneurial spirit, the fact that commercial insurance is an aleatory 
contract makes this kind of transaction not well accepted by the Islamic 
traditional jurists202. Abbas Husni Mohamed says that the criterion for the 
condemnation of the commercial insurance contract under Islamic sharia is 
clearly the involvement of jahala, gharar, usury, gambling or wagering 
rather than the lack of interest of any of the parties to the contract in the 
subject-matter of insurance203. 
                                                          
198 See H. VISSER, Islamic Finance, cit., p. 61. 
199 F.E. VOGEL, S.L. HAYES, Islamic Law, cit., p. 225, and H. VISSER, Islamic Finance, 
cit., pp. 61-62. 
200 Since Islamic finance, in general, places special emphasis on social welfare as a 
criterion of business practice almost discouraging wealth maximization, Islamic insurance 
is meant to be a cooperative model of insurance (H. MASUD, Takaful: an Innovative 
Approach to Insurance and Islamic Finance, in University of Pennsylvania Journal of International 
Law, n. 32/2011, p. 1133). 
201 For an overview of the recent developments of the Takaful market, see S. JAFFER, 
Banca Takaful challenges and opportunities, in Islamic Finance Review (2009-2010). 
202 See P. MOLYNEUX, M. IQBAL, Thirty Years, cit., p. 160 (listing three forms of risk: 
first, the “entrepreneurial risk” that arises in the normal course of business; second, the risk 
of natural disasters; and third, the unnecessary, self-created risk that arises when people 
play “games”). The Author s suggest that the first two types of risk are inherent in daily 
life and must be addressed. Id. (clarifying that “games”, which create risks that are not part 
of daily life, are unnecessary for the individual because the individual could avoid them 
by choosing not to play them and are unnecessary for society because they do not 
contribute to societal wealth). These "games" are equitable to gambling, which Islam 
prohibits. 
203 S. MANKABADY, Insurance and Islamic Law. The Islamic Insurance Company, in Arab 
Law Quarterly, n. 4/1989, p. 199; R. MAHMOOD, Takaful: the Islamic System of Mutual 
Insurance - the Malaysian Experience, in Arab Law Quarterly, n. 6/1991, p. 280; M.M. BILLAH, 
A Model of Life Insurance in the Contemporary Islamic Economy, in Arab Law Quarterly, n. 
12/1997, p. 287; M.B. ARBOUNA, The Operation of Retakaful (Islamic Reinsurance) Protection, 
in Arab Law Quarterly, in 15/2000, p. 335; R.I. BEKKIN, Islamic Insurance: National Features 
and Legal Regulation, in Arab Law Quarterly, n. 21/2007, p. 3. 
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Such principles need to be interpreted by taking into account that the 
Islamic shari’ah requires the internalization of absolute good faith in 
transactions. 
Islamic Law regards these contracts as Uberrimae Fidei contracts (ugud 
amana), or, in other words, it considers them as contracts of good faith. In these 
contracts the buyer trusts the seller to tell him the original price with no 
need for proof. 
The doctrine has argued in favour of cooperative insurance as a 
substitute for commercial insurance. Consequently, the insurance company 
follows the PLS criteria, sharing with a pool of policy holders the mutually 
agreed risk to cover each other in case of loss204. The fees of the insurance 
company, in this way, are not seen as a premium paid for the insurance to 
the policy holders but as a sort of a management fee to carry on the business. 
These contributions are pooled into a common fund and invested according 
to sharì'ah-compliant investment options. According to this structure, the 
Islamic insurance company does not provide any assurance/insurance to 
the policy-holders, but acts on their behalf to manage the business. The 
members agree that if any of them suffer a covered loss, then each will make 
a proportionate gift from their accounts to cover that loss.  
The acceptance of this contract is to be found in the belief that 
gratuitous acts permit a higher degree of uncertainty, and, in addition, that 
gift promises can be binding. In that way, the insurance pool is more similar 
to a charitable institution, since it carries on the business as a cooperative 
on behalf of its members (the fund is simply managed by a corporation, 
while the actual ownership lies with the participants in the fund who must 
pay out claims205): profits are shared by the policy holders rather than given 
to third-party shareholders206. 
This is in strict accordance with the Islamic ideals of welfare and 
charitable giving: “the system is a collective enterprise that allows a 
community to pool together resources in order to assist members of the 
community in times of need resulting from casualty or loss”207. 
                                                          
204 See M.M. BILLAH, Islamic Insurance: its Origins and Development, in Arab Law 
Quarterly, n. 13/1998, p. 386, explaining that it is acceptable to protect oneself against 
suffering, but it is improper to profit from that suffering and, as such, the Islamic insurance 
industry was developed around the idea of taking care of one another. 
205 H. MASUD, Takaful: an Innovative, cit., p. 1144. 
206 H. MASUD, Takaful: an Innovative, cit., p. 1143, also in the Takaful model, there is a 
shari’ah board that regulates the takaful company to ensure that products being offered by 
the company are consistent with Islamic law. 
207 H. MASUD, Takaful: an Innovative, cit., p. 1142. 
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The profit is the final outcome of the gross revenue minus the 
payment of any claim: the surplus will be shared among the investors 
(company and policy holders) according to a predetermined formula.  
And, accordingly to the literal meaning of takaful ("solidarity"), this 
institution tends to protect the members from any loss.  
Clearly, there is a difference in the ratio between conventional and 
Islamic insurance: while the former seeks to eliminate risk for the 
individual, the latter pursues the same aim, but in reference to a 
community208.  
 
i) Sukuk (Islamic Bonds or Debt Securities) 
Sukuk, literally a plural form of saak (title or investment certificate), is of 
ancient origins209: in its contractual form it existed at least from the seventh 
century210. These days, the market globalization is increasingly enhancing 
                                                          
208 H. MASUD, Takaful: an Innovative, cit., p. 1142. One problematic aspect regarding 
takaful operations concerns the capital adequacy requirement, which is necessary in many 
countries. E. GROSSMAN, The Human, cit., p. 1033. “Regardless of whether takaful is just 
an exercise in creative labeling, Muslim societies around the world have, over the past three 
decades, exhibited a trend of openly validating takaful and even, in some instances, have 
institutionalized the system on a national scale”. Just to quote some examples, see, the 1995 
Qatar established the Qatar Islamic Insurance Company, the 2005 Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency (SAMA) Regulations for cooperative insurance, the 2005 Bahrain Monetary 
Authority Rules regulating takaful companies, and the 2010 Accounting and Auditing 
Standards for Islamic Financial Institution Islamic Insurance Standard No. 26. See, R.I. 
BEKKIN, Islamic Insurance: National Features and Legal Regulation, in Arab Law Quarterly, 
21/2007, pp. 113-14, discussing how the Islamic insurance system relies on the concept of 
gift-giving to avoid gharar. See also A. KHAN, Islamic Insurance: Evolution, Models and 
Issues, in Policy Perspective, 13/2016, pp. 29, 30-32 (describing the development of takaful 
systems within various countries). 
209 However, according to J.E. McKEAN, The Future of Conflict Between Islamic and 
Western Financial Systems: Profit, Principle and Pragmatism, in University of Pittsburgh Law 
Review, n. 71/2010, p. 819, the modern sukuk appeared in Bahrain in 2001 and in Malaysia 
in 2002.  
210 R. HANEEF, Recent Trends and Innovations in Islamic Debt Securities: Prospects for 
Islamic Profit and Loss Sharing Securities, in Islamic Finance: Current Legal and Regulatory 
Issues, edited by S.A. Nazi, The Islamic Finance Project, Islamic Legal Studies Program, 
Harvard Law School, Cambridge, 2005, pp. 29-30. The Author explains that Soldiers and 
other public officials were paid in cash, as well as in kind. «The payment in kind was in 
the form of [...] “commodity coupons” or “grain permits” (both sukuk) that were entitled 
for the promised quantity of the commodity (usually grains) upon maturity of the coupons 
or permits, as the case may be. In 2001, fourteen centuries later, the practice of sukuk was 
revived: the Kingdom of Bahrain issued USD $ 250 million with five years of maturity». 
K.I. TALAHMA, Islamic Bonds (Sukuk): Opportunities and Challenges, in Asper Review of 
International Business and Trade Law, n. 15/2015, p. 422, states that: “[t]here is a clear lack of 
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the spread of the sukuk agreement211 in practice, as well as making it more 
and more complex212 in order to follow the evolution of international 
transactions213.  
The structure of the sukuk, that is an asset-backed instrument, in 
extreme synthesis, equals that of a bond issue while remaining compliant 
with the Sharìa, as the investor will not receive any predetermined interest 
rate, even if they are granted an income with a good degree of certainty. In 
a very often spread formula, sukuk are associated to real estate assets 
corresponding to the ownership of those assets214. However, when sukuk is 
used to guarantee purchasers interest-free loans and repurchase 
agreements in case of missed payments or default, it violates the gharar 
restrictions and, so, is not sharia-compliant, as investor’s returns are linked 
to the creditworthiness of the issuer instead of the value of the underlying 
assets215.  
The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI) issued the Standard for Investment Sukuk (Standards) 
                                                          
any legislative framework capable of regulating the issuance of Islamic bonds (sukuk), 
listing them and trading in them in some Islamic countries. This has resulted in a lack of 
uniformity in the transactions related to this instrument. Different jurisdictions have 
conflicting visions of how Islamic bonds should work. Some of these differences stem from 
alternative viewpoints as to the applicable jurisprudence and confusion between religion 
and politics in matters that should be left to experts in the fields of economics investment 
and management”. 
211 See A.H.A. KHALEQ, P. DOWSETT, Managing Sukuk in the current climate: Moving 
the goalpost and calling time, in Islamic Finance Review, 2009-2010, for a good analysis of the 
recent developments of this financial instrument. The Author s underline the dramatic 
contraction of the Sukuk market in 2008 and try to explain the reasons behind it. 
212 See A.H. ABDEL-KHALEQ, C.F. RICHARDSON, New Horizons for Islamic Securities: 
Emerging Trends in Sukuk Offerings, in Chicago Journal of International Law, n. 5/2007, p. 409, 
according to whom this complexity derives from applicable laws regarding bankruptcy, 
tax, trusts, corporations, securities regulations, real property, and secured transactions that 
all influence the proper structuring and documentation of asset-backed sukuk transactions 
in non-Islamic jurisdictions that are marketed to investors outside the Muslim world or 
issued by entities located in non-Islamic states. 
213 See M.A. EL-GAMAL, Islamic Finance, cit., pp. 11-13 (discussing the role of financial 
providers, jurists, and lawyers in the development of IFS products and explaining that 
when a product is first developed, it has a captive market and is very profitable, but then 
is easily replicated, reducing its profit margin). 
214 See H. VISSER, Islamic Finance, cit., pp. 63-64. 
215 S.R. ANDERSON, Recent Development: Forthcoming Changes in the Shari’ah Compliance 
Regime for Islamic Finance, in Yale Journal of International Law, n. 35/2010, p. 237. 
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in 2003216. The AAOIFI Standards do not treat sukuk as debts of the issuer, 
but as “fractional or proportional interests in underlying assets, usufructs, 
services, projects, or investment activities”217.  
The main differences with traditional bonds are that sukuk “represent 
an ownership interest on the part of the holders in the enterprise underlying 
the issue of the sukuk”218, pay out returns based on the performance of the 
underlying asset219, and, imply a binding promise made by the asset 
manager to repurchase the sukuk at the same price of the original sale220. 
 
j) Damanah (Third-Party Guarantee) 
Islamic law allows a third party to serve as a guarantor to the contracting 
parties. The guarantor, however, can only charge for its administrative 
expenses, and not for the cost of capital221.  
Owing to compensation restrictions, these guarantors only sponsor 
entities such as the government or holding companies. The guarantor also 
holds a lien on the contract assets222.  
 
k) Ba'i Bithaman Ajil (Deferred Payment Financing) 
Ba'i bithaman ajil involves a credit sale of goods on a deferred payment 
basis223. At customer request, the financial institution purchases an existing 
contract in order to buy certain assets on a deferred payment schedule and 
                                                          
216 See M.J.T. McMILLEN, Sukuk (Islamic Bonds and Securitization): Toward a Viable 
Capital (Including Secondary Market), in Integrating Islamic Finance in The Mainstream: 
Regulation, Standardization and Transparency, edited by S.A. Nazi, The Islamic Finance 
Project, Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, 2007. 
217 M.J.T. McMILLEN, Contractual Enforceability Issues: Sukuk and Capital Market 
Development, in Chicago Journal of International Law, n. 7/2007, p. 429. 
218 See J.E. McKEAN, The Future, cit., p. 819.  
219 J.E. McKEAN, The Future, cit., p. 819. From an operative standpoint, it means that 
sukuk is provided by an additional agreement in which the holder is entitled to returns at 
a certain percentage (based on LIBOR interest rates). Following the performance, then, if 
the assets underperform, the manager of the asset will pay out the difference in the form 
of an interest-free loan; otherwise, the surplus will be recovered by the manager to pay the 
loans; but, in this case, it is possible to include a bonus for the manager in case such loans 
have not been concluded.  
220 Instead, in a traditional bond, upon the maturity, the holder is - regardless of the 
performance of the underlying asset - entitled to the return of the principal. This difference 
is based on the fact that sharia principles ask for a return based on the performance of the 
underlying asset (Id). 
221 F.E. VOGEL, S.L. HAYES, Islamic Law, cit., p. 221.  
222 F. E. VOGEL, S.L. HAYES, Islamic Law, cit., p. 221.  
223 G. BILAL, Islamic Finance, cit., p. 154. 
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then, it sells those goods back to the customer at an agreed-upon price, 
including also a profit.  
The payments to the original supplier of the goods are progressively 
made by the financial institution, as the goods are manufactured or 
purchased. The financial institution's customer “can repay in lump sum or 
make installment payments over a predetermined period”224. 
 
l) Bai inah (Repurchase by seller) 
Bai inah consists in a particular kind of repurchase by the seller225. The 
contracting parties are the buyer, a customer, and the seller, a bank or other 
financial institutions. The customer buys something on credit from the 
financial institution and then sells it back to the bank itself. The second sale 
will be at a lower price than the first one and the bank will provide 
immediate payment. This archetype could be applied to every credit 
transactio226. 
Scholars are divided on this contractual practice and some of them 
consider it haram227. 
 
m) Tawarruk (Monetization method) 
Tawarruk is another debated Islamic financial instrument, whose 
compliance with Sharìa principles is not clear of doubts.  
This contract usually involves three parties: one party buys 
something on credit from a second party and sells it to a third one which 
pays immediately228. In other words, the financial institution trades in 
                                                          
224 G. BILAL, Islamic Finance, cit., p. 154. 
225 See H. VISSER, Islamic Finance, cit., p. 69. 
226 Compared with Talmudic law, it considers as ribbit d'rabbanan a wide number of 
credit-extending practices, making the most common transactions in Islamic finance 
unacceptable. The general rule is that a businessman cannot charge different prices for 
cash, credit, or advance payment sales. This simple statement would have the effect to 
render the already analyzed bai' bithaman ajil, murabaha, tawarruq, and bai' al-"ina, 
ineffective under Rabbinic legislation since they violate the no-charge interest transaction 
principle (M.H. LUBETSKY, Losing Interest, cit., p. 252). 
227 See H. VISSER, Islamic Finance, cit., p. 69. 
228 Another similar situation occurs when a person joins an association, makes regular 
contributions, and, after a certain period of time, takes out a qard hasan (interest-free loan). 
The simple schema just described is an effective financial technique to organize credit 
within a community recalling the nineteenth century credit cooperatives. Furthermore, it 
is similar to the social idea of Islamic banking, where the cooperative, or communal, or co-
operational element is seen as a relevant feature. Obviously, the backlash of this financial 
structure is the limited economical relevance, depending on the people forming a local 
community. “In addition, it depends on personal trust and is not suited for the 
«industrialized» business of retail banking”. K. BALZ, Islamic Finance for European Muslims: 
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commodities on behalf of its client, who receives funds for their own 
purpose. At a formal level, this operation looks like a conventional 
consumer finance transaction, but, from the financial institution point of 
view the transaction is here asset-based229. 
Tawarruk is often used when a subject, often a financial institution or 
an entrepreneur, needs liquid funds. As anticipated, some scholars consider 




14 - Islamic Finance 
 
The origins of Islamic finance date back to the days when the camel 
caravans used to cross the trade routes and the Arabian deserts. The 
simplified business plan of that time saw a wealthy merchant providing 
money to traders (bearing the risk to purchase goods and to carry them) in 
exchange for a remuneration, if the caravan had positively completed its 
round, but with the associated risk of a loss if the caravan had got lost or 
been robbed during its journey. 
This kind of agreement was welcomed by sharia because, on the one 
hand, it respected the prohibition of lending money with an interest rate, 
and, on the other hand, by allocating the risk (a reward or a loss are shared 
by the participants), it encouraged the businessmen to transform 
unproductive resources into productive ones231. 
This equity-participation system was not unknown to the Western 
financial tradition, as it had been proposed at various times during 
economic crises in the United States and Latin America. 
                                                          
the Diversity Management of Shari’ah-Compliant Transactions, in Chicago Journal of International 
Law, n. 7/2007, p. 560. 
229 In the very common purchase of a car, e.g., the bank will not be involved in the 
purchase; instead, it will carry out a commodity transaction, operation whose risk is much 
easier to allocate. This schema can - with a certain degree of success - be applied to 
consumer credit in general, even if the Islamic legitimacy of tawarruq transactions remains 
disputed since a substantive approach to Islamic banking principles requires the financial 
institution to take on business risk and to be involved in the concrete transaction (K. BALZ, 
Islamic Finance, cit., pp. 560-561).  
230 See H. VISSER, Islamic Finance, cit., pp. 69-70. 
231 A. BERSCHADSKY, Innovative Financial Securities in the Middle East: Surmounting the 
Ban of Interest in Islamic Law, in University of Miami Business Law Review, n. 9/2001, pp. 109-
110. 
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While these principles were used as the basis for a flourishing 
economy in earlier times, it was only in the late 20th century that a number 
of Islamic banks were formed to provide an alternative basis to Muslims, 
although Islamic banking is not restricted to Muslims alone. 
This economic context radically changed in the seventies owing to 
the oil boom flooding the State’s coffers and the cash desks of the oil 
producing countries of the Middle East. From that moment, since the 
savings were becoming more and more relevant, the call for fruitful 
investments has increased. But, of course, everything should have been 
done according to sharia (the founding Islamic principles on finance are 
influenced by historical and economical changes so that, although these 
principles are not completely unknown, presumably, their original 
meaning has been transformed over the epochs)232. 
Therefore, the modern Islamic finance is a recent phenomenon; it 
began in 1963 in Egypt under Ahmad El Najjar who set up an Islamic bank 
under the guise of a savings bank (interest free) so as not to upset the secular 
Egyptian government233. This bank was founded in Mit Ghamr, a rural and 
highly religious area in Egypt, and this enlightened project was carried out 
to allow the inhabitants to use their savings (had not the project been sharia-
complaint, they would have never placed their savings in any bank) and to 
be educated about the uses and purposes of banks234. 
The Mit Ghamr project was successful, as deposits increased from 
1963 to 1966. The bank was cautious, rejecting about 60% of the loan 
applications and the default ratio was zero in economically good times. The 
Nasir Social Bank fully disclosed its activity in 1971235. 
                                                          
232 G.M. PICCINELLI, Banche islamiche in contesto non islamico. Materiali e strumenti 
giuridici, Ipocan, Rome, 1994. 
233 The recent development of Islamic finance is a reaction to the globalization of 
financial markets and to the spread of Western financial institutions throughout the 
world's economies, which are able to cross the borders of the Muslim world. However, it 
is also part of a larger trend started in the 1970s aimed at reintroducing Islamic law in many 
Muslim countries. Notwithstanding this tendency, the influence on laws and institutions 
derived from the Western legal systems remains the dominant one. H. MASUD, Takaful: 
an Innovative, cit., p. 1133. 
234 The types of accounts accepted are: (i) Savings accounts; (ii) Investment accounts; 
(iii) Zakat accounts. No interest was paid on savings accounts, but withdrawals could be 
made on demand. Small, short-term, interest-free loans for productive purposes could be 
made. Funds in investment accounts were subject to restricted withdrawals and invested 
on the basis of profit-sharing.  
235 M.S. BILLAH, Arab Money: why Isn’t The United States Getting Any?, in University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, n. 32/2011, p. 1066. But the project was eventually 
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Then, a second wave of impulse for the modern Islamic Finance 
began with the recession of colonialism and the Muslim self-identification: 
the Philippine Amanah Bank was established in 1973, the Dubai Islamic 
Bank in 1975, the Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt in 1977, the Faisal Islamic 
Bank of Sudan in 1977, the Bahrain Islamic Bank in 1979, and the Malaysian 
Muslim Pilgrims Savings Corporation in 1983236. 
The modern Islamic Finance entered the Western marketplace in 
1978 when the Islamic Banking Systems (now Islamic Finance House) was 
established in Luxembourg237. 
“Today, there are over three hundred Islamic financial institutions in 
seventy-five countries, one-fourth of which operate in countries with non-
Muslim majority populations”238. 
Today, the popularity of this form of finance seems to be increasing 
since the leading principles on which Islamic finance is based (namely, the 
requirement that investments and financings be tied to productive assets 
and speculative investments be avoided as well as the sharing of risks in 
projects’ development) have played an important role in limiting the 
negative effects of the ongoing financial crisis on the investors, who need 
not worry about illusory profits which could be wiped out by currency 
fluctuations or the decline in value of option or futures contract239.  
The current trend, given this premise, has been characterized by a 
flow of resources into Islamic mutual funds since the investors perceive a 
higher degree of safety in the sharia-compliant financial products avoiding 
the stocks of financial institutions and companies that have been highly 
leveraged and, moreover, because Islamic institutions are assumed not to 
be holding toxic assets as opposed to conventional banks240. 
                                                          
abandoned for political reasons. Nevertheless, it had shown that commercial banking 
could be organised on a non-interest basis. 
236 These data are drawn from M.S. BILLAH, Arab Money, cit., p. 1066. The same Author 
underlines that Islamic banks were established in Iran and Pakistan in a subsequent 
moment. 
237 M.S. BILLAH, Arab Money, cit., p. 1066. Then, the Islamic Bank International 
(Copenhagen), Islamic Investment Company (Melbourne), and the Citi Islamic Investment 
Bank (Bahrain) followed. 
238 M.S. BILLAH, Arab Money, cit., pp. 1066-1067. 
239 This basic structure has been used in syndicated financing facilities for sharia-
compliant companies on a regular basis, but this financing arrangement has become more 
prominent as the sukuk capital markets contracted (G. BILAL, Islamic Finance, cit., p. 145).  
240 I. SALAH, Islamic Finance in the Current Financial Crisis, in Berkeley Journal of Middle 
Eastern and Islamic Law, n. 2/2009, p. 137. 
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Nevertheless, it has to be said that Islamic finance has not been 
immune to the pressures caused by the globalized financial crisis241. 
Indeed, beyond the differences already highlighted, parallels with 
conventional finance abound: in both cases, in fact, due diligence is carried 
out to evaluate the client's creditworthiness; the purchased asset serves as a 
collateral (and other sureties can be additionally required by the banks); 
and, when the bargain is concluded the client becomes a debtor of the 
bank242. 
Even if the Islamic finance has been able to manage quite safely the 
subprime and swap debacle started in the 2008 (thanks, as already 
mentioned, to the tenets of its own financial system, e.g. the securitization 
of debt the avoidance of the bets inherent to credit default swaps, the 
excessive leverage, and more generally the sheer complexity and opacity of 
the derivatives and their distance and disconnection from real assets and so 
on), it has been affected by a ‘second level bubble’, the one caused by a fall 
in asset prices (see, e.g., oil, real estate, shares etc.)243. 
This financial slowdown has been concealed by the incredibly high 
growth rates of Islamic banks (that, in the last decades, reached double 
digits, and increased by 26% in 2006 and by 38% in 2007)244.  
Furthermore, though it is not possible to provide the precise 
dimension of this sector, it is worth mentioning that there are over 250 
banks operating worldwide that offer Islamic banking services, with an 
aggregate of over 200 billion U.S. dollars in deposits 245 and that the Islamic 
finance industry is estimated to be valued at $ 1 trillion and expected to 
grow up to $ 2.8 trillion by 2015246. 
                                                          
241 I. SALAH, Islamic Finance, cit., p. 137: “On a transactional level, shari’ah-compliant 
investments have responded in a manner quite comparable to conventional transactions, 
largely because the financing for those transactions is often indirectly funded with 
conventional financing”. 
242 See I. WARDE, Corporate Governance and Islamic Moral Hazard, in Islamic Finance: 
Current Legal and Regulatory Issues, edited by A. Nazim, Islamic Finance Project, Islamic 
Studies Program, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, 2005, and, more recently, see I. 
WARDE, The Relevance, cit., pp. 159-171. 
243 I. WARDE, The Relevance, cit., pp. 159-171. 
244 I. WARDE, The Relevance, cit., p. 166. The Author pertinently suggests that Islamic 
finance has been going through constant changes, due to “changing political-economic 
context, dynamics of interaction with the conventional sector, and more broadly as the 
result of processes of trial and error”. 
245 H. AHMED, Not Interested, cit. 
246 M.M. TOMEH, Persuasion and Authority, cit., pp. 153-154.  
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Related, instead, to the geographical spread, Islamic banking 
services are provided not only by the predominantly Muslim countries but 
also by those where the Muslim population is the minority. Australia, Italy, 
Russia, South Africa, Switzerland, and above all the U.K - currently 
considered the hub for this service247 - have found it useful to meet the 
banking needs of their resident Muslim population248. 
The idea to make the interests of all stakeholders of a financial 
transaction (namely, depositors, financial institutions and entrepreneurs) 
converge - giving the bank the role of a private venturer - seems very 
promising.  
If such idea is combined with the Islamic financial rule to bring 
economic benefits to the society at large (by means of the circulation of 
savings, the propulsion of productive investment and the general economic 
welfare), the result is a socioeconomic system potentially alternative to Wall 
Street’s laissez-faire one249. 
This structure can be more easily accepted because modern Islamic 
financial practice is no longer a strictly ‘traditional’ one, since it has been 
implemented and modified in the course of time.  
This sentence is not to be intended drastically: in simple words, 
 
“this does not mean that Islamic finance is indistinguishable from the 
current financial trends. It is still a unique approach that fulfills a dual 
purpose: granting Muslims an alternative to traditional financial 
instruments, while making these instruments an attractive option in 
modern economies”250. 
 
                                                          
247 S.M. NIZAMI, Islamic Finance: the United Kingdom’s Dive to Become the Global Islamic 
Finance Hub and the United States’ Irrational Indifference to Islamic Finance, in Suffolk 
Transnational Law Review, n. 34/2011, p. 219. 
248 H. AHMED, Not Interested, cit. But see, e.g., M. SILVA, Islamic Banking Remarks’, in 
Law and Business Review of the Americas, n. 12/2006, p. 201, stating that, despite noteworthy 
implementations, “there is no Islamic bank in the United States per se. That is, there is no 
stand-alone institution that is dedicated to shari’ah compliance and that provides a full 
range of banking services”. 
249 A model based on self-regulation nature of finance, the necessity to deregulation and 
innovate, etc. See W.S. HEGAZY, Contemporary Islamic Finance: from Socioeconomic Idealism 
to Pure Legalism, in Chicago Journal of International Law n. 7/2007, pp. 581-603; S. 
GRISWOLD, A Redeeming Interest in Religious Freedom: Are Islamic Mortage Alternatives 
Clogs on the Equitable Right of Redemption?, in Fordham Journal of Corporate and Financial Law, 
n. 13/2008, p. 419; H.A. HAMOUDI, Jurisprudential schizophrenia, cit., p. 605.  
250 H. MASUD, Takaful: an Innovative, cit., p. 1133. 
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Obviously, there are some inconsistencies between the abstract 
system and the real one.  
Indeed, the majority of transactions in the Islamic financial world 
consist of the murabaha type and are usually short-term financings.  
In so doing, these kinds of transactions do not correspond to the 
tenets of the Islamic doctrine but, on the contrary, they resemble those of 
conventional finance251; then, as a consequence, genuine PLS are almost 
insignificant252 and the Islamic finance comes to mirror the conventional 
finance253. 
Reversing the perspective, conventional financial institutions must 
meet some specific requirements in order to comply with the sharia finance: 
the segregation of funds; the establishment of a sharia supervisory board; 
the presence of a management committed to Islamic financial concepts; a 
system of safeguards for investors; and the compliance with the standards 
of the AAOIFI254. 
So, even if Islamic Finance has been a monopoly of local banks in 
Middle East and Malaysia, nowadays also non-Muslim institutions have 
begun to offer sharia-compliant services and this trend is now expected to 
grow255.  
                                                          
251 O. AGHA, Islamic Finance, cit., pp. 125-135. 
252 Fund management transactions where the profit participation element is present are 
an exception (I. WARDE, Islamic Finance, cit., pp. 167-168). 
253 The issue related to the imitation of the conventional financial system must be 
properly addressed since - given the monopoly played by the Wall Street model - the 
Islamic sector “appeared as one of the few structured systems of finance that offer some 
differences” (I. WARDE, Islamic Finance, cit., pp. 168-169).  
254 K.J. TACY, Islamic Finance: a Growing Industry in the United States, in North Carolina 
Banking Institute, n. 10/2006, p. 369. See also S.N. YAQUBY, Shari’ah Requirements for 
conventional banks, available at http://www.islamic-banking.com/iarticle_7.aspx (last visited 21 
November 2016), and A. MIRAKHOR, Hopes for the Future of Islamic Finance, in 
http://www.islamic-banking.com/iarticle_7.aspx (last visited 28 February 2018). It is important 
to note that, in any case, besides the kinds of banking operations described in the text as 
typically Islamic, there is the offer of a full spectrum of fee-paid retail services always 
interest-free, that include checking accounts, spot foreign exchange transactions, fund 
transfers, letters of credit, travellers' checks, safe-deposit boxes, securities safekeeping 
investment management and advice, and other normal services of modern banking. 
Islamic bank can also carry business with both Muslims and non-Muslims alike. See J.M. 
TAYLOR, Islamic Banking - The Feasibility of Establishing an Islamic Bank in The United States, 
in American Business Law Journal, n. 40/2003, pp. 385-414. 
255 M.A. EL-GAMAL, Islamic Finance, cit., p. 108, offers a punctual representation of the 
role of the codified variant to Islamic law in the officially Islamized countries like Iran, 
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The most popular practice is the issuance of sukuk as it is testified by 
the examples reported by HSBC, Citigroup, Barclays Capital, Deutsche 
Bank, BNP Paribas, and Standard Charter256. 
Trying to set out which contingencies could have contributed to this 
fast growth of Islamic Finance, it is possible to mention that i) sharia-
compliant products are increasingly attractive to capital providers since the 
differential cost between traditional and Islamic products narrows; ii) the 
wealth of Muslim countries has increased thanks to high oil prices 
(therefore, Muslim investors have started looking for sharia-compliant 
options); iii) the regional lending capacity in Muslim-populated areas has 
raised; iv) large-scale development projects in the Gulf region have been 
launched which consequently have brought new lenders into that market; 
v) the availability of sharia-compliant products has been made easier; vi) 
finally, there has been a growing sense of religious identity among 
professional Muslims, who have been seeking new, tangible ways to 
express their values257; vii) overall, Islamic finance is slowly becoming more 
regulated and practiced both in countries where Muslims are the majority 
and even in those where Muslim minorities dominate the political and 
business environments258. 
Among the challenges this growth has to face, one of the main 
problems for Islamic bankers is to be accepted by their own societies. In fact, 
even if this financial sector of started thanks to the investments of the oil 
                                                          
Pakistan and Sudan. These laws aim at “eradicate[ing] interest” and so “the financial 
systems in those States are therefore politically mandated to «interest-free»”. 
256 T. KARASIK, F.C. WEHREY, S. STROM, Islamic Business and Commercial Law: 
Islamic Finance in a Global Context: Opportunities and Challenges, in Chicago Journal of 
International Law, n. 7/2007, pp. 385-386. Similarly, a number of large law firms have 
Islamic business departments or units (T. KARASIK, F.C. WEHREY, S. STROM, Islamic 
Business, cit., p. 386).  
257 T. KARASIK, F.C. WEHREY, S. STROM, Islamic Business, cit., p. 386. 
258 T. KARASIK, F.C. WEHREY, S. STROM, Islamic Business, cit., pp. 386-387. Yet, not 
all Muslim countries are switching to full-service Islamic financial institutions. The money 
market, equity, and hedge fund sectors are also vital to Islamic Finance, but they need to 
be adapted. Therefore, money market funds and bank accounts do not guarantee a fixed 
investment return; mutual funds do not invest in industries such as pork, gambling, 
entertainment, traditional financial services, and defence/weapons or in companies that 
are excessively leveraged. These limitations allowed, in any case, a great number of 
companies available for investment as it is shown by the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index 
that up to June 2006 listed 1,937 companies eligible for investment; hedge funds consistent 
with sharia started with the Saudi Economic and Development Company (SEDCO) in the 
fall of 2003. Finally, in 2007, the People's Republic of China launched its first Islamic bond 
with a $ 200 million deal with Kuwait Finance House for a Chinese power company. 
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companies, its further development could be driven by the needs of the 
middle class: from the purchase of new houses to small business loans, from 
the building of a retirement plan to personal investments259. 
Islamic finance has always been a fluid blend of business, politics, 
and religion, adapting to cultural differences and changing tastes. This 
tradition of flexibility and ingenuity will become increasingly indispensable 
as Islamic finance grows to reflect the diversity and vitality of Muslims 
around the globe260. 
In other words, there is no one size fits all approach to Islamic retail 
finance as each one must be tailored to the local environment in which it 
operates261. 
However, such fragmentation and flexibility could also be a strength 
since they could allow for the development of new international regimes 
and alliances with both Muslims and non-Muslims.262 
                                                          
259 R.R. BIANCHI, The Revolution in Islamic Finance, in Chicago Journal of International 
Law, n. 7/2007, pp. 569-580. 
260 R.R. BIANCHI, The Revolution, cit., pp. 569-580. 
261 K. BALZ, Islamic Finance, pp. 560-561. G. JEHLE, Innovation, Arbitrage, cit., pp. 1365-
66, underlines that also a different process steps out leading to the creation of a sort of an 
Islamic lex mercatoria. In fact, “uncertainty and fragmentation among conflicting 
interpretations of Shari'ah by SSBs and other experts is currently being resolved […] 
contributing to the emergence of an increasingly coherent body of transnational Islamic 
finance law. […] a process of organic convergence is beginning to take place, under which 
the accepted trade practices of IFIs, given legitimacy by the fatawa of SSBs and other 
scholars, has led to a degree of consensus and consistency in some areas of practice”. The 
Author clearly adds that “[t]his gradual crystallization of nonstate-driven norms drawn 
from standard business practices, soft-law codes, nonbinding standards such as the 
AAOIFI Principles, and opinions of loosely affiliated experts (such as SRBs and OIC 
Shari'ah scholars), exemplifies what has come to be known as transnational law. […] [T]he 
Islamic finance law that is emerging from standardized industry practices, the work of 
Shari'ah scholars, and nonbinding standards such as the AAOIFI Principles is largely 
generated without intervention from any state but is able to affect compliance from 
participants in the Islamic finance industry across the globe. Just as multinational 
corporations may be driven to comply with corporate social responsibility codes for fear 
of the reputational consequences of noncompliance, IFIs and other participants in the 
Islamic finance industry have a strong incentive to comply with the generally accepted 
principles of transnational Islamic finance law for fear that their actions might be perceived 
as un-Islamic and thus rejected by consumers, investors, or other stakeholders”. 
262 R.R. BIANCHI, The Revolution, cit., pp. 569-580. E. GROSSMAN, The Human, cit., p. 
1034, maintains that “[e]ven if one begins from a starting point where the Qur'an is 
undeniably divine, it is difficult to ignore the patently human aspects of these hiyal […] 
Functionalism […] allows for the irruption of humanity's subjective value judgments into 
a space where divine or rigid rules would (or should) otherwise apply. It is thus difficult 
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to harmonize functionalism with a vision of Islamic jurisprudence that requires top-down 
legislation and adjudication guided by the original Qur'anic source-text”. This dissonance 
could be reconciled maintaining that the true words of God are by their very nature 
unknowable. Therefore, “[…] It could follow, then, that if there is brooding, omnipresent, 
and true Shari'a law out in the ether, then the process of Islamic lawmaking is the 
profoundly human act of distilling it down to a cognizable form. In other words, the 
purpose of the commandment or prohibition becomes more important than the modes and 
forms of the actual doing or the actual withholding.” C. ARJONA, G. JEHLE, Islamic Law, 
cit., p. 255, “[a]s is the case with most other legal traditions, the long history of Islamic law 
can be seen as a balance between rigidness and stability, on the one hand, and openness 
and dynamism, on the other. In this way, contemporary debates over Islamic finance are 
part of a longstanding contest between purists and pragmatists over the permissible 
mechanisms through which the law should be adapted to meet changed political, 
economic, and social conditions, as well as the limits of such adaptation. The development 
of the Islamic finance industry is a testament to the influence of Islamic revivalist thinkers 
who envisioned a new form of Islamic economics that would challenge both the capitalist 
and communist economic orders. However, rather than engaging in a radical rethinking of 
the methodology of Islamic law, Islamic finance scholars drew upon traditional tools of 
Islamic jurisprudence to make their legal arguments. The development of the Islamic 
finance industry thus displays both the historical continuity and the dynamism of Shari"ah 
as a legal system”. See, also, H.P. GLENN, Legal Traditions of the World, Oxford University 
Press, 2014, pp. 213-14. Contemporary Islamic finance is pervaded by doctrinal pluralism 
and is adopting less stringent opinions from different schools to structure complex 
transactions. This tendency has been depicted as an ad hoc approach to jurisprudence, or 
as talfiq (patching). See H.A. HAMOUDI, The Muezzin's Call and the Dow Jones Bell: On the 
Necessity of Realism in the Study of Islamic Law, in American Journal of Comparative Law, 
56//2008, pp. 423, 443-45. But as a legal doctrine has recently written: “[i]n pre-modern 
legal writing the use of a less stringent opinion, either within a particular school or across 
school lines, for a particular transaction was generally known as tatabbu" al-rukhas 
(pursuing the dispensations of the schools). A legal subject could achieve this by seeking 
advice in the form of a non-binding opinion (fatwa) from a scholar of a school different 
from that which the subject typically uses. A judge could also refer a case for resolution to 
a judge of another school according to the less stringent opinion. In modern discourse, the 
term tatabbu" al-rukhas was gradually replaced by takhayyur (eclecticism). In contrast 
with tatabbu" al-rukhas/takhayyur, which involve the choice of a less stringent opinion 
and its application to the entire transaction, the practice of talfiq involves the application 
of multiple legal opinions within the same transaction (or two back-to-back transactions) 
to achieve a result that would be accepted by no school, hence its name, which implies 
patching or stitching together”. C. ARJONA, G. JEHLE, Islamic Law, cit., p. 255. All of these 
choice of law concepts, defined as "pragmatic eclecticism" represent technique according 
to which pre-modern scholars resorted to the doctrinal pluralism of the law in order to 
realize a given economic or social aim within the borders of taqlid. C. ARJONA, G. JEHLE, 
Islamic Law, cit., p. 264. So, “[m]odern Islamic finance scholars have followed the Majallah's 
methodology of "utilitarian choice" (takhayyur) by freely choosing among the opinions of 
the classical jurists based on what they believe is in the best interest of the community”. C. 
ARJONA, G. JEHLE, Islamic Law, cit., p. 267. To this end, according to Arjona and Jehle, 
“the most productive approach for contemporary Islamic finance lawyers would be to look 
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15 - Conclusions 
 
The legal systems taken into account throughout this article have deep-
rooted differences: some are based on civil codes; some put their faith in 
precedents, while others have developed from religious texts.  
The diversity among the declamatory provisions within the different 
systems seems to mirror the distance that separates them. As a result, one 
would expect opposite operational solutions, reflecting such diversity.  
However, the financial systems of Islamic and Western economies, 
surprisingly, share more than a similar initial development: the common 
strict prohibition of lending money at interest was then followed by the 
creation of legal fictions or fictiones to lighten such restriction263.  
Over time, Western economies have progressively stopped 
considering such activity as absolutely negative. On the contrary, they 
began to see it as a possibility for the development of their industrial and 
commercial activities. Once lending at interest ceased to be prohibited and 
consequently loans were finally considered legal, the use of fictions became 
meaningless.  
In common law countries in particular, the spread of the laissez-faire 
doctrine, according to which the State does not have to regulate private 
transactions by means of imperative rules, freed interest rates from 
statutory limits.  
Notwithstanding some positive implications related to this theory, 
its uncontrolled application has led, in recent years, to the degeneration 
represented, among others, by the payday loan phenomenon. 
                                                          
to the idea of maslahah, or communal welfare, both in determining the scope of permissible 
doctrinal pluralism and in weighing the legitimacy of using hiyal-like strategies in 
planning Islamic financial transactions”. C. ARJONA, G. JEHLE, Islamic Law, cit., p. 270. 
Maslahah represents the spiritual benefit gained by the believer in complying with God's 
law, the underlying benefit to humanity that forms the basis of the ruling, “In this way, 
existing rulings may be adapted to suit changed circumstances if they no longer benefit the 
community. It is this conception of maslahah that offers the greatest potential for change 
and adaptation for Islamic finance practitioners”. C. ARJONA, G. JEHLE, Islamic Law, cit., 
p. 271. 
263 It is possible to summarize the historical evolution of the idea of interest and usury 
into the following three stages: a) a first stage in which it was generally forbidden (ancient 
times); b) a second stage in which a small rate of interest was permitted, but it was strongly 
regulated and limited from the State; c) a third stage in which it was thought that existing 
prohibitions on interest were wrongful and they should have been either decreased or 
removed altogether. 
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On the opposite side, the late industrial and economic growth of 
sharia leaded countries postponed, their need to create means to circumvent 
or eliminate the riba prohibition264. 
As a result, even by means of the aforementioned fictions, which 
are essential to survive in the modern economy as well as to offer all the 
services that people need, those States currently retain such strong 
limitations with regard to financial operations, which, though, have 
partially protected them from the damage caused by the global financial 
crisis, while offering good perspectives to quickly overcome it.  
                                                          
264 Official ‘Islamized’ States, such as Iran, Pakistan and Sudan, produce a codified 
variant of Islamic law that plays a central role in the legitimacy of the ruling regimes. These 
laws constitute the first position in the hierarchy of Islamic law. In the area of finance, for 
example, this completely Islamized way of thinking is very explicit in Pakistan, where in 
the past two decades there have been a great number of banking laws, all aiming to 
eradicate interest. See M.A. EL-GAMAL, Interest and the Paradox of Contemporary Islamic 
Law and Finance, in Islamic banking and finance, edited by A. Al-Roubaie and S. Alvi, 
Routledge, London, 2003, p. 2. The second hierarchical level of Islamic law is represented 
by the Islamic law of Muslim States, which have actual civil codes declaring Islamic law as 
their source of legislation. An example is the Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution, 
amended in May 1980, later strengthened through the following Egyptian Constitutional 
Court’s ruling: “It is therefore not permitted that a legislative text contradicts those rules 
of sharia whose origin and interpretation are definitive, since these rules are the only ones 
regarding which new interpretive effort (ijtihad) is impossible, as they represent, in Islamic 
sharia, the supreme principles and fixed foundations that admit neither allegorical 
interpretation, nor modification. In addition, we should not contemplate that their 
meaning would change with changes in time and place, from which it follows that they are 
impermeable to any amendment, and that it is not permitted to go beyond them or change 
their meaning. The authority of the High Constitutional Court in this regard is limited to 
safeguarding their implementation and overruling any other legal rule that contradicts 
them” (see S. HABACHY, Commentary on the Decision of the Supreme Court of Egypt Given 
on 4 May 1985 Concerning the Legitimacy of Interest and the Constitutionality of Article 226 of 
the New Egyptian Civil Code of 1948, in Arab Law Quarterly, n. 1/1985-1986, p. 239. The third 
level of the hierarchy mentioned above concerns Islamic law pronouncements made by 
some important institutes such as: The Institute of Islamic Research at Al-Azhar University, 
established in Cairo in 1961; The Islamic Jurisprudence Institute of the Islamic League, 
established in Mecca in 1979; The Fiqh Institute or Academy of the Organization of Islamic 
conference, established in 1984 with a home in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The members of these 
institutes are appointed by their respective governments. A fourth category, defined 
‘Islamic law’, adds another level of complexity to Islamic finance. This category has been 
endorsed by popular jurists who frequently rely on medieval literature in Islamic 
jurisprudence and frequently quote canonical texts to support these earlier opinions. The 
influence of these jurists has increased exponentially in recent years. See M.A. EL-
GAMAL, Islamic Finance, cit. 
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Islamic financial instruments could represent the core of a less 
vulnerable financial model, founded on ethical principles meant to protect 
the single citizens from abuses and inequalities, and to prevent the banks 
themselves from triggering a systemic collapse.265 
                                                          
265 A. FUCCILLO, F. SORVILLO, Religious freedom, cit., p. 18 highlight that “[t]he 
general objectives in particular render the Ethical Bank's ultimate goals real in the sense 
that it addresses mainly the financing of categories of persons "not" or "hardly bankable”, 
suggesting, in this way, more control of consumption and more attention to the use of 
savings by directing them towards nobler, social uses, on the basis of choices characterized 
by high "rates" of moral integrity. More examples could be provided. Just think of the use 
of microcredit as a tool for promoting financial inclusion of marginalized segments of the 
population, or of the forms of fair trade actually carried out in developing countries in the 
South of the world by way of production processes based on respect for hard work and 
natural resources, in order to provide, at the same time, the countries and markets in the 
North with new products that meet the demands for quality (and price) of "ethically 
oriented" consumers, thus helping to translate into reality paths of sustainable 
globalization. All these examples serve to emphasize that the relationship between 
financial and religious factors, far from being a theoretical invention, represent an actual 
reality that has a development potential not yet well explored although sometimes already 
tested as in the case of "cooperative" labour.” M. GRADOLI, M. DEL CARMEN DE LA 
ORDEN DE LA CRUZ, P. SÁNCHEZ GONZÁLEZ, Vie d’inclusione dei musulmani in 
Europa: marketing halal e banca islamica, in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale, n. 24/2016, 
available at www.statoechiese.it (last visited 21 January 2019), pp. 28-29, underlines how the 
Islamic Bank is an instrument apt to facilitate the financial inclusion. L. ANDERLONI, B. 
BAYOT, P. BLEDOWSKI, M. IWANICZ-DROZDOWSKA, E. KEMPSON, Financial 
services provision and prevention of financial exclusion, European Commission, Bruxelles, 2008, 
p. 10, define Financial inclusion as “[t]he perfect financial inclusion may therefore be 
described by the capacity to access and use appropriate financial services proposed by 
mainstream providers. Meanwhile, there may be an adequate “second best choice” to get 
appropriate services proposed by alternative providers that comply with rules and 
regulations and do not exploit low-income people. At least, an authenticated “social / open 
minded” provider may give a sufficiently safe / positive image to enable excluded people 
to try once again financial services, which could then be the first step towards financial 
inclusion with mainstream financial providers”. See, also, S.B. NACEUR, A. BARAJAS, 
A. MASSARA, Can Islamic Banking Increase Financial Inclusion?, IMF Working Paper, 
WP/15/31, 2015; M. MOHIELDIN, Z. IQBAL, A.M. ROSTOM, X. FU, The role of Islamic 
finance in enhancing financial inclusion, in Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries 
in Islamic Economic Studies, 20/2012, pp. 55-120. Of course, “religion can act as a barrier to 
use – especially in Muslim populations” and “religious factors deter people from opening 
savings accounts just as they deter them from using credit”: L. ANDERLONI, B. BAYOT, 
P. BLEDOWSKI, M. IWANICZ-DROZDOWSKA, E. KEMPSON, Financial services, cit., 
p. 42. See E. KEMPSON, Saving in Low-income and Ethnic Minority Households, Personal 
Investment Authority, London, 1999; S. COLLARD, E. KEMPSON, C. WHYLEY, Tackling 
Financial Exclusion: An Area-based Approach, Policy Press, Bristol, 2001; and S. COLLARD, 
E. KEMPSON, Affordable Credit: The Way Forward, Joseph Rowntree Foundation, York, 
2005. 
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In any case, the differences among the legal instruments created by 
the different legal traditions to rule the aforementioned issue reveal the 
fundamental diversity of mind regarding the role of law and its 
interpretation266.  
A survey on the rationales and the legal justifications grounding 
these differences can be very productive if carried out for the purpose of 
out developing a dialogue among the different cultures and traditions; the 
discovery of shared principle and outcomes between shari’ah and Western 
legal traditions can be a useful tool to build a bridge between them267.  
From a free market point of view, juxtaposing the words ethic268 and 
finance seems ironic, especially after having identified the cause of the global 
financial crisis itself: the hazard of certain institutions and of their 
managers, guided only by profit without paying adequate attention to the 
consequences of their behavior (for instance, the dramatic consequences of 
sub-prime loans, the abuse of derivatives, etc.)269. 
                                                          
266 M.H. LUBETSKY, Losing Interest, cit., p. 238, interprets the relatively permissive 
approach to interest-avoiding transactions as reflecting “a formalist approach to legal 
interpretation and an essentially ordering vocation of law”. But, also the Western legal 
tradition has gone through its formalist periods and some aspects are still visible today. 
267 M.H. LUBETSKY, Losing Interest, cit., p. 238. This comparison is useful not just to 
identify the similarities but also to better understand the causes of difference. 
268 See U.F. MOGHUL, A.A. AHMED, Contractual Forms in Islamic Finance Law and 
Islamic Inv. Co. of The Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd. V. Symphony Gems N.V. & Ors.: a First Impression 
of Islamic Finance, in Fordham International Law Journal, n. 27/2003, pp. 150-156, who clearly 
underline that Islamic finance remains closely tied to the Islamic religion and, so, from a 
modern finance perspective, the main issue in dealing with Islamic finance is 
understanding “what it means for finance to be based in religion”. On the Islamic side, 
instead, the task is to tailor fourteen centuries of legal scholarship in a new dress (twenty 
years old) and with a fashion “completely alien” to it (U.F. MOGHUL, A.A. AHMED, 
Contractual Forms, cit., p. 157).  
269 M. d’ARIENZO, I fondamenti religiosi della finanza islamica in Stato, Chiese e pluralismo 
confessionale, n. 25/2012, available at www.statoechiese.it (last visited 21 January 2019), pp. 
6-7 underlines that ethic and Islamic finance are both inspired not only by efficiency, 
competition, or profit maximization goals but are based on social cooperation. To this end, 
this becomes the epiphany of a social responsible finance. It is worthy of mention the fact 
that ethical finance was born at the beginning of the twentieth century in USA to satisfy 
the needs of religious movements. See, G.M. PICCINELLI, Economia e banche tra Islam e 
Occidente, in Iura Orientalia II (2006), pp. 128-134 (www.iuraorientalia.net). In this respect, the 
principles inspired by the religious ethic such as social responsibility, equity, and solidarity 
constitute a concrete alternative to the profit maximization that normally characterizes the 
traditional financial market. In other words, the same Author concludes suggesting a 
recovery of an “economic ethic” to achieve an opener global society, but above all a fairer 
one. M. d’ARIENZO, I fondamenti religiosi, cit., pp. 8-9. 
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Consumers have gradually lost their faith in banking institutions, 
indicated as the source of the crisis and so, of all their problems. Besides, 
certain categories of persons would never step into a traditional bank as a 
consequence of their religious or ethical beliefs. These two aspects may lead 
to a dangerous capital immobility, especially in those Western countries 
where the presence of Muslim immigrants, bound by the riba prohibition, 
is growing year after year270. 
Sharìa-compliant financial institutions - characterized by a slightly 
stronger consumer protection and based on ethical principles - can be seen 
as a possibility to attract new potential investors and to move the huge 
amount of liquid assets present in the Gulf zone to the Western area. A 
wider circulation of capital and a rediscovered faith in the act of investing 
and in the banks themselves - together with the fact that an alternative 
model exists and is available - could represent a key solution to overcome 
the global financial crisis271. 
                                                          
270 B. SABAHI, Islamic Financial Structures as Alternatives to International Loan 
Agreements: Challenges for U.S. Financial Institutions, in Annual Review of Banking and 
Financial Law, n. 24/2005, p. 487, says that to non-Muslims, the Islamic finance system 
(based on contractual structures in which the financier participates with the borrowers in 
the project, or enters into trade with them, and cannot totally isolate itself from the 
operation's risks) is an unconventional method of conducting business, according to the 
Author , it is predictable that the use of sharia-compliant modes of financing by U.S. banks 
will increase in the future (many large U.S. financial institutions, have already established 
Islamic financing units). Specifically, in this system, the banks can break down the barriers 
of operations that they traditionally do not undertake, such as project management. This 
kind of system, in addition, is not furnished with the standard safeguards against loss, such 
as default mechanisms and security interests in project assets, since they are not available 
in Islamic financing contracts (B. SABAHI, Islamic Financial Structures, cit., p. 503). See also 
G.M. PICCINELLI, La Finanza islamica tra crisi globale e innovazione: la prospettiva europea, in 
Il Libro e La Bilancia. Studi in memoria di Francesco Castro, edited by M. Papa, G.M. Piccinelli, 
D. Scolart, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, Neaples, 2010, p. 977. 
271 C. BEYER RICHINS, Shari’ah Compliant Securities: American Lawyers Meet Islamic 
Finance, in Journal of Legal Profession, n. 33/2008, p. 135, suggests that lawyers dealing with 
Islamic counterparts by complying with Islamic finance principles will not only fulfil their 
ethical obligations, but also protect their clients' reputations and minimize unnecessary 
risk. G. GORDON, D. ZARING, Ethical Bankers, in Journal of Corporation Law, n. 42/2017, 
p. 559, “[e]thics represent a next step in a broad-reaching effort to recreate credible financial 
standards in the wake of the financial crisis, and one fascinatingly different from the prior 
efforts. Post-crisis reform has been many things, but one unifying principle has been the 
effort to develop highly detailed and very quantitative measures of the positions and 
resources of financial institutions. There is nothing quantitative or detailed about the effort 
to impose ethics on banks”.  
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Even if we cannot simply transplant the Islamic model into Western 
legislation272, its vicinity to ethical finance and its positive effects on capital 
movement make it an interesting archetype for reforms de iure condendo273.  
In conclusion, if three decades ago, many saw Islamic finance as an 
oxymoron274, today, Islamic banking and finance no longer represent an 
uncertain experiment275. 
But there is more, in fact it possible to assert that there are no 
significant barriers today to the reception of these model in the West, as 
                                                          
272 The issues related to credit, interest rate, and the relationship between debtor and 
creditor are well regulated by all the legal systems and the rules promulgated to facilitate 
the lending prevail over the restrictive regulations. M. H. Lubetsky with a vivid image 
concluded that: “These mechanisms produce largely the same results - Alex gets his loan, 
Ahmed his bai' bithaman ajil, Abraham his heter iska”. M.H. LUBETSKY, Losing Interest, 
cit., p. 238. H.A. HAMOUDI, The Impossible, Highly Desired Islamic Bank, in Willam and Mary 
Business Law Review, n. 5/2014, p. 109, concluded that “[t]here is no credible shari'a 
compliant banking institution to facilitate. Instead, there are only compromises to be made, 
inevitably on the side of the Islamic bank, and plain shari'a violations to endure”. But, the 
same Author continues saying that: “[t]he pious Muslim, eager to see an Islamic bank open 
in her neighborhood, earn a national charter, and offer products and services, including 
demand deposit services, is at best only partly interested in adherence to religious doctrine. 
At the very least, with the slightest bit of inspection, that Muslim will surely discover 
practices at stark variance with some of the core rules of Islamic finance and almost in 
direct opposition to the purported principles of the practice. Yet, the Muslim remains eager 
because the Islamic bank is a reflection of a broader recognition of her space in the broader 
American fabric. Her religion is not only recognized, but her financial practices are 
respected and indeed legitimized by the relevant American legal and regulatory regime. 
She is, in this sense, comfortable being both thoroughly American and thoroughly Muslim” 
(H.A. HAMOUDI, The Impossible, cit., p. 110). 
273 C.F. RICHARDSON, Islamic Finance Opportunities in the Oil and Gas Sector: An 
Introduction to an Emerging Field, in Texas International Law Journal, n. 42/2006, p. 119, clearly 
represents the oil sector industry like a good example of this perspective. In fact, in States 
like Texas and Louisiana, «state law holds that the working interest in a mineral lease gives 
the holder a real property interest in the mineral estate (and, furthermore, holds that the 
mineral estate is actually the”dominant estate” in the property)». Another industrial area 
of possible eligibility is seen in the field of renewable energy where the interaction between 
the socially responsible projects and Islamic investing is clearer.  
The Author quotes the example of an Italian developer who considered Islamic finance 
techniques to finance the development of wind farms. This tendency could play a role in 
the cross-border commercial and economic cooperation with the Islamic world. 
274 S.R. ANDERSON, Recent Development, cit., p. 237. 
275 R. SIDDIQUI, Shari’ah Compliance, Performance, and Conversion: the Case of the Dow 
Jones Islamic Market Index, in Chicago Journal of International Law, n. 7/2007, p. 495.  
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demonstrated by the experiences already underway, although with varying 
degrees of success in results and attitudes276. 
 
 
                                                          
276 A more thorough study of these issues will be the subject of a future essay, while a 
concrete analysis of how an Islamic bank could be established (in Italy) and how these 
contracts could be drafted belongs in a monographic study. But, it is worth mentioning a 
possible taxonomy. See, in this regard, P. LEE, The Regulation of Securities and Islamic Finance 
in Dubai: Implications for Models of Sharī'ah Compliance, in UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near 
Eastern Law, n. 15/2016, p. 14, distinguishes among three different regulatory systems 
(Dubai DIFC, Malaysia, and the U.S. and U.K.) naming them 1) systems-based model; 2) 
centralized model; 3) a model of competitive equality, derived in part from an International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) report on Islamic securities. The term 
systems-based model indicates an approach where there is not, “and a regulator in a pure 
systems-based model would not, have a means of issuing its own fatāw; on Islamic financial 
activities. Instead, this responsibility falls to the Sharī'ah Supervisor Boards at the level of 
the various entities involved in an activity or transaction. As may be evident, this paper 
takes the DIFC as a prototype for the systems-based model. […] the term centralized model 
is used to describe an approach involving the presence of a single authority that can make 
a substantive determination on whether a particular financial activity or instrument is 
Sharī'ah-compliant. For instance, in Malaysia. Finally, the model of competitive equality is 
used to describe approaches in Western jurisdictions that lack a separate regulatory system 
for Islamic finance, instead aiming for equal treatment of Islamic finance and conventional 
finance”. Another classifications distinguishes among five models: “(1) a reactive approach 
in the U.K. and Turkey; (2) a passive approach, indicating the complete absence of a 
regulatory response, unique to Saudi Arabia; (3) a minimalist approach in the other GCC 
countries; (4) a pro-active approach in Malaysia; and (5) an interventionist approach, 
referring to the ability of the Pakistani Sharī'ah Federal Court to make final rulings on 
Sharī'ah matters despite the establishment of a national Shari'ah board at the State Bank of 
Pakistan” (Z. HASAN, Regulatory Framework of Shari'ah Governance System in Malaysia, GCC 
Countries and the U.K., in Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies, n. 3/2009, pp. 83-84).  
Then, IOSCO, Analysis of the Application of IOSCO's Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation for Islamic Securities Products, n. 17/2008, available at http://www.iosco.org/library/ 
pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD280.pdf, distinguishes 1) a systems approach; 2) a centralized 
approach; 3) a conventional approach; 4) other. The concept of ‘competitive equality’ is 
taken from the U.S. Bank regulation; here regulation states at the principle that state-
chartered and federally-chartered banks should have equal competitive footing. See, e.g., 
D.R. FISCHEL, A.M. ROSENFIELD, R.S. STILLMAN, The Regulation of Banks and Bank 
Holding Companies, in Virginia Law Review, n. 73/1987, pp. 335-337.  
